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Abstract 
This paper deals with institutional challenges German works councils face currently. 
These challenges consist of structural economic change from industrial to service 
sectors accompanied by an extension of ‘co-determination-free-zones’, an enhanced 
labour force diversity beyond the image of the male blue collar worker as the ‘normal 
employee’ works councils represent, the transformation of companies into network 
companies splitting up established works councils, co-management in times of com-
petitive restructuring of firms and the emergence of new postfordistic production 
models with ambivalent impacts on working conditions. Moreover, works councils are 
challenged by a partial decentralisation of collective bargaining towards the estab-
lishment level dissolving the established division of labour between works councils 
and trade unions. These new challenges confront works councils with risks of struc-
tural overcharge endangering their institutional stability. Institutional learning may 
increase the institutional capabilities and competences required to works councils in 
order to meet new challenges. It could focus on a critical reflection of established 
practises in interest representation, utilising workforce diversity as a social resource 
of interest representation and promote co-operation between works councils in net-
work companies or multinationals. However, works councils are not capable of meet-
ing new challenges self-destined, rather they still depend on a supportive infrastruc-
ture of advice and consultancy provided by trade unions. In order to offer support 
tailored to the needs of works councils and to overcome their crisis in respect to so-
cial legitimacy trade unions will as well have to undergo processes of institutional 
learning to enhance their regional capacities of action, to promote innovative ideas or 
social issues and to utilise the increased workforce diversity as a starting point to at-
tract new target groups of potential union members. The recognition of workforce di-
versity proves to be a significant prerequisite to draw on diversity as a social resource 
of institutional learning by works councils and unions.       
 
 
1. Introduction 
In Germany works councils proved to be a stable institution of industrial relations de-
spite their - at first glance - fragile intermediary character which rests on their legally 
‘implanted’ orientation to balance the representation of employees’ interests with tak-
ing account of the economic situation of establishments. The ‘success story’ of works 
councils has been questioned since the 1990ies when co-determination free zones in 
the German economy extended, especially in the expanding service economy, whilst 
traditional industrial sectors as works councils’ strongholds were confronted with se-
vere economic crises, plant closures, restructuring and dismissals. These trends 
nourished apprehensions works councils to become an ‘endangered species’. More-
over, works councils’ stability is at stake because of new challenges this institution 
has been confronted with. New challenges to works councils consist of - among oth-
ers - the transformation of firms into network companies which split up and fragmen-
tise established company structures and works councils. New challenges also em-
brace a partial decentralisation of collective bargaining to the establishment level. 
The latter had been alien to works councils’ institutional configuration. Hereby, the 
established ‘division of labour’ between works councils and trade unions is altered. 
These new challenges foster a structural overcharge of works councils and question 
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their ability to cope successfully with these challenges. This institutional crisis 
of works councils triggers the quest for starting points to overcome the crisis. In this 
paper I would like to highlight processes of institutional learning as a potential starting 
point for works councils to meet new challenges. Taking into account that works 
councils will presumably not be capable of meeting these new challenges by them-
selves, I will also explore trade unions’ prerequisites and starting points to provide a 
supportive infrastructure to works councils. Trade unions might not be capable of de-
livering a supportive infrastructure tailored to the new challenges works councils face, 
unless they also initialise or enhance processes of institutional learning.       
This paper1 consists of three larger parts and nine chapters. The first part gives an 
overview on works councils as a social institution of the German system of industrial 
relations. It covers the chapters 2 to 6. In the second chapter the main features of the 
German model of Industrial Relations are characterised in order to illustrate the insti-
tutional setting works councils in Germany are embedded in. In the third chapter the 
legal framework of co-determination with regard to the company and the establish-
ment level will be introduced to. It also embraces an overview on works councils’ le-
gal rights and obligations. This chapter includes a brief outline of the historical devel-
opment of works councils as an institution of German industrial relations. Then the 
construction principles of works councils as a social institution are discussed in the 
fourth chapter. In the fifth chapter the relationship between works councils and trade 
unions is focused on. The first part of this paper closes with an overview on the dis-
tribution of works councils in Germany. The second part of this paper, i.e. chapter 7, 
deals with new challenges to works councils since the 1990ies. It deals with the focal 
challenges to the institution of works councils, i.e. the sectoral change of the German 
economy, the increased labour force diversity of the German economy, the transfor-
mation of firms and the partial decentralisation of collective bargaining to the estab-
lishment level. Moreover, it refers to the fragility of support to works councils provided 
by German trade unions in times of union centralisation and financial crisis. The third 
part of this paper includes the eighth chapter and the final chapter. In the eighth 
chapter several potential starting points of institutional learning are discussed which 
might enable the institution of works councils to cope with new challenges. It also 
underscores the relevance of trade unions for a future stability of works councils. In 
the final chapter a summary is presented and conclusions are drawn. 
    
2. Institutional Core Features of German Industrial Relations 
New challenges to works councils and impacts on their potential institutional change 
are not comprehensible without reference to the German industrial relations systems 
works councils are embedded in. These new challenges, which will be discussed in 
this paper, are often interlinked with the change of German industrial relations. 
Therefore, the German system of industrial relations is sketched.    
                                                
1 I would like to dedicate this paper to my colleagues Franca Alacevich and Andrea Bellini. Both of 
them offered me the opportunity to present and discuss an earlier version of this paper in the Master 
program European Labour Studies at the University of Florence during my stay as a visiting lecturer in 
March 2004. It is especially because of their great hospitality, friendship and support I enjoyed my visit 
to the University of Florence very much.      
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In general the industrial relations system of Germany reflects a corporatist model of 
industrial relations in industrialised market economies (cf. Visser 1996). This model 
consists of a collective bargaining system with a highly organised, concentrated and 
co-ordinated structure of interest representation. There is a tendency towards inte-
grative bargaining between labour and capital. Integrative bargaining is rooted in 
shared social values between the main actors of German industrial relations, above 
all social partnership between labour and capital, power balancing and the widely 
spread belief in the so-called ‘Social Market Economy’. The latter aims at meeting 
goals of economic competitiveness on the one hand and social balance and fairness 
on the other hand (cf. Müller-Jentsch 2003a: 42). The moral culture of the German 
industrial relations system is based on three main values (cf. Voswinkel 1999: 118): 
 
 fair distribution of gains and burdens, 
 the idea that such a distribution should be negotiated and is based on consensus, 
 the idea that establishments should have a social constitution, in which employ-
ees are not alone treated as costs effecting manpower but as organisational 
members.  
 
The tendency to integrative bargaining is reinforced by a high level of detailed legal 
regulation concerning labour conflicts and workplace relations (cf. Müller-Jentsch 
1997). If labour related conflicts cannot be resolved between the social partners or 
management and works councils, then they are dealt with by labour courts which ex-
ist at national, regional and local levels. Judge-made law is especially of importance 
in matters of industrial dispute because a specific law which focuses on strikes or 
lockouts is not available in Germany. This juridification of the German model chan-
nels industrial conflicts and fosters a professionalisation of conflict management.  
In Germany the state plays a significant role as legislator within the tripartite industrial 
relations system. This refers mainly to labour law, social policy and economic or in-
dustrial policy which influence the framework of German industrial relations. Com-
pared to other states and to the former Weimar Republic a direct state-intervention in 
collective bargaining processes is restricted to collective bargaining in the public sec-
tor: The state - represented among others by the minister of internal affairs - negoti-
ates directly as public employer with trade unions (cf. Keller/Henneberger 1999). 
Within the corporatist model the state (and its agencies) plays more or less a facilitat-
ing role or acts as ‘decision broker’ with regard to different interest organisations (cf. 
Visser 1996: 27). This specific role can be explained by representatives of different 
interest groups who exert influence on the state and its agencies. This role as deci-
sion broker also refers to the German state. For example, the German state acted as 
decision broker within the tripartite socio-economic concerted efforts initiated by the 
government during the 1960ies and the 1990ies. Moreover, the red-green govern-
ment invited trade unions and employers’ associations to join the tripartite „Alliance 
for Jobs, Training and Competitiveness“ in 1998 which was targeted to combat un-
employment and to improve labour market conditions on the supply side. This alli-
ance failed because unions and employers’ associations were not willing to work out 
compromises (Jacobi 2003: 17). Besides this traditional role as decision broker the 
German state guarantees the functionability of the system of industrial relations by 
the provision of a dense network of procedural regulations which form the legal 
framework of industrial relations.  
German industrial relations rest on two institutional pillars: free collective bargaining 
and works constitution. Both of them form the dual structure of interest representa-
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tion. Each institutional pillar creates a political arena which embraces specific 
social actors and sets of legal regulation (cf. Müller-Jentsch 1997). A central legal 
fundament of the collective bargaining autonomy (Tarifautonomie) is the Act on Col-
lective Agreements (1949) (Tarifvertragsgesetz). It guarantees autonomy to trade 
unions and single employers, i.e. large companies, as e.g. Volkswagen, or employ-
ers’ associations to bargain and regulate terms and conditions of employment, such 
as wages, working time and other working conditions, respecting basic legal provi-
sions (cf. Bispinck/Schulten 1999: 185; Jacobi 2003: 19). Collective bargaining is 
primarily based on multi-employer and industrial sector-wide (regional) agreements 
between trade unions and employer associations. In collective agreements minimum 
conditions for establishments and employees of a certain industry are laid down. If a 
collective agreement is settled the social partners have to fulfil their legal peace obli-
gation during the period of time the agreement is valid. In case of a failure of negotia-
tions and subsequent procedures of interest mediation by a neutral mediator unions 
and employers can utilise their exclusive right to conduct industrial disputes which 
covers legal strikes or defensive lockouts to settle a compromise.   
Works councils and management are the focal actors in the arena of works constitu-
tion. Contrary to the arena of collective bargaining strikes and lockouts are prohibited 
at the workplace level whereby the means of conflict resolution is restricted to peace-
ful negotiations and labour court proceedings (cf. Jacobi/Keller/Müller-Jentsch 1998: 
190). Moreover, works councils and management may settle works agreements 
which include higher standards on working conditions than those agreed on in collec-
tive agreements. For instance, management and works councils settled agreements 
on higher wage levels compared to collective agreements in times of economic pros-
perity. The most important legal framework within the arena of works constitution is 
the Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz). It refers to workers’ repre-
sentation at the workplace level and guarantees a democratic election of works 
councils by the workforce of a company. Works councils are legally independent of 
unions as well as of employers.  
Both of the arenas share some common features: Firstly, interest representation is 
based on the principle of collective representation. Unions and works councils can be 
characterised as institutions which represent employees and are allowed to act and 
decide in the name of the entire workforce or membership they represent. Employees 
can only exert a limited control with regard to their representatives, mainly by elec-
tions. Employers’ associations represent all employers of a specific industry or - in 
the case of peak organisations - of the entire economy. Their representation is based 
on the „virtue of their strength of organisation” (ibid: 191). Secondly, employers’ as-
sociations, unions and works councils can be described as so-called ‘intermediary’ 
institutions (ibid.). Such institutions have to interact simultaneously at least with two 
important environments. One of them consists of a more or less voluntary member-
ship they represent, whilst the other one belongs to the spectre of institutional envi-
ronments. Therefore, intermediary institutions have to take account of and adapt to 
both of these relevant environments and their logics of action (cf. Streeck 1987: 473). 
For instance, works councils are by law obliged to take account of the economic 
goals of an establishment or a company on the one hand, whilst they represent the 
interests of employees of a certain establishment. German trade unions developed to 
interest mediators between labour and capital. Moreover, they proved to be support-
ers of the industrial tradition of „social partnership“. This mediating role also counts 
for employers’ associations with regard to their diverse membership of firms and to 
 8
trade unions.  Last but not least, the German model of interest representation 
is characterised by relative centralisation. Centralisation refers to collective bargain-
ing and to the co-ordination of policies of social partners at the sectoral level. Em-
ployer associations and trade unions organised themselves in highly centralised con-
federations. The path of centralisation resulted in a „relatively centralised bargaining 
system with large bargaining territories“ (Jacobi et al. 1998: 191). 
With the exception of the provision of “the freedom of association”, which is inte-
grated as well in the constitution of the German Federal Republic as well as in the 
Act on Collective Agreements, all legal provisions regarding the recognition of unions 
refer to legal decisions by judges. Jacobi (2003: 23 p.) pointed out the formal prereq-
uisites for the recognition of unions: “They must be: (i) voluntary, with members free 
to join and leave; (ii) democratically structured organisations2, with leaders elected by 
members; (iii) associations that pursue members’ interests independent of both gov-
ernment and employers; (iv) strong enough to push forward their demands, both will-
ing and capable to use strikes as a last resort for putting pressure on employers; and 
(v) not ad-hoc-coalitions in pursuit of short-term goals but rather, they must maintain 
a permanent apparatus in order to regulate labour relations by implementing collec-
tive bargaining agreements.” The judge-made law on the recognition of trade unions 
aims at avoiding the recognition of weak unions being dependent on employers as 
well as at guaranteeing access to the arena of collective bargaining (ibid: 24).   
After World War II German unions opted for the principle of unitary trade unions (Ein-
heitsprinzip) in order to overcome former political barriers and rivalries. Moreover, the 
former distinction of unions of different crafts and occupations was transformed by 
the principle of „one industry - one union“, i.e. solely one union represents the em-
ployees in an industry or establishment (Jacobi 2003: 20). This path to centralisation 
minimised competition among trade unions. The German Federation of Trade Unions 
(DGB) serves as the umbrella association of eight individual unions. The DGB’s weak 
power position - in comparison to its affiliated trade unions - results mainly from the 
umbrella association’s lack of rights to bargain collectively and to strike in industrial 
disputes. The financial power of the DGB is comparatively low compared to individual 
unions, especially the larger unions, because unionists pay their membership fees to 
the individual union they belong to. Therefore, the main function of the DGB consists 
in political representation (ibid: 21). Pace setters among German trade unions are 
above all the IG Metall (IGM) who organises workers in metal industries, engineering 
and automobile industry, then the chemical workers’ union (IGBCE) and the newly 
amalgamated service sector union ver.di. Especially the union of metal, engineering 
and automobile workers emphasised its dominant role as a pace-setter on the un-
ions’ side in collective bargaining and as a social pioneer. The IG Metall often negoti-
ates with its counterpart on the employer side collective pilot agreements at regional 
and industrial sector level, which are taken over by other social partners at the re-
gional level in the metal industry sector. The outcomes and contents of these pilot 
agreements often function as a guideline for collective bargaining processes in other 
                                                
2 Union democracy rests on a “delegate system with representative and executive bodies at local, regional and 
national levels” (Jacobi et al. 1998: 203). The national executive committee of a trade union, which is responsible 
for union policy implementation, is elected by members of the national trade union conference taking place in a 
four years term. The participation of ordinary union members is limited to elections for local union representatives 
and to ballots on strikes in collective bargaining disputes between unions and employers’ associations.  
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branches. For instance, the IG Metall underscored its predominant role as a 
social pioneer by the introduction of the 35-working hour-week as result of a previous 
successful strike. The chemical workers’ union e.g. acted as social pioneer by the 
conclusion of an agreement with the employer association on a common, integrated 
remuneration scheme for blue- and white collar workers.   
In Germany business interests are represented by three different types of organisa-
tions (cf. Jacobi 2003, 25 pp.): the German Chambers of Industry and Commerce 
deal with a broad spectre of semi-governmental or public task on grounds of legal 
status and offer a variety of services to firms as their obligatory membership. Some 
examples may illustrate their variety of tasks: the chambers act as the body which 
tests the knowledge and capabilities of apprentices after having finished their appren-
ticeship; moreover, they are involved in political processes to develop new profiles or 
curricula in vocational training or formation. They also function as the body of regis-
tration for establishments, which participate in the European Eco-Management and 
Audit Scheme (EMAS). The umbrella association of the chambers, called German 
Association of Industry and Commerce, represents 82 regional chambers. The sec-
ond type of business association is organised by industry at the local or regional 
level. It offers services to their voluntary members and represents the economic in-
terests of firms in political or legislating processes. This especially refers to the um-
brella-association, the German Industry Association. Whilst members of the latter 
organisation mainly represent industrial and larger firms, small and medium-sized 
firms are often affiliated to the Central Association of German Crafts.  
Among business interest organisations the right to collective bargaining is restricted 
to employers’ associations negotiating with trade unions sectoral and multi-employer 
collective agreements. Although collective bargaining in most industries is focussed 
on the regional level, it is embedded in strong co-ordination and process control by 
national employers’ associations. The Confederation of German Employers’ Associa-
tions (BDA) forms the umbrella organisation of employers’ associations at sectoral, 
regional and local levels. It embraces 75 per cent of firms in the private sector ac-
cording to their own provided statistical data. The BDA bears a specific resemblance 
with the DGB because both of the umbrella organisations do not negotiate collective 
agreements, but act as co-ordinators and mediators. The most important sectoral 
employers’ association in Germany is the Federation of Employers’ Associations of 
the Metalworking Industry which covers more than 6000 member firms with about 60 
per cent of employees working in this industrial sector. 
3. The Legal Framework of Co-Determination 
In Germany co-determination by employees’ representatives is not restricted to the 
plant-level, but also covers the company level and weaker forms of co-determination 
in self-governing bodies of social insurance institutions, in the federal agency of em-
ployment (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) and union representation in public institutions 
and committees (e.g. German public broadcasting companies) and in some pension 
funds. Moreover, employee representatives are involved in several local or regional 
alliances for jobs and formation (cf. Müller-Jentsch 2003a: 456). Co-determination at 
the company level reflects a legally institutionalised form of participation of employ-
ees’ representatives in corporate decision making. Co-determination in this sense is 
only restricted to larger companies. Co-determination by works councils rests on the 
election of works councillors even in small firms with at least five employees. Works 
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councils are elected by the entire workforce of a company or 
establishment. The Works Constitution Act (BetrVG) defines the participation rights of 
works councils differentiating between information, consultation and co-
determination. Further on co-determination at company and at establishment level 
will be described.   
3.1 Co-determination at the Company Level 
Co-determination at the company level refers to a specific system of corporate gov-
ernance: In larger companies the supervisory board appoints and supervises the 
smaller management board of a company whose main task is running the company. 
Members of the management board have to report regularly to the supervisory 
boards of joint-stock companies and limited liability companies. There are three dif-
ferent types of co-determination at company level, each of them embedded in a dif-
ferent legal framework (cf. Jacobi et al. 1998: 198 p.; Müller-Jentsch 2003: 39-44).  
The first type of legal provisions is the „Coal and Steel Co-determination Act“. After 
World War II the German coal and steel industries were restructured by the British 
allied forces who introduced co-determination at company level in larger coal and 
steel companies. This co-determination was legally codified in 1951 by German gov-
ernment and parliament. It embraces all steel and coal companies with at least 1.000 
employees. The legal core of the „Coal and Steel Co-determination Act“ (MontanMit-
bestG) consists of a full-parity representation of shareholders and employees on the 
supervisory board. Each side of capital and labour is represented by five members on 
the supervisory board. The labour side includes two representatives nominated by 
works councils, another two members are nominated by the union confederation after 
consultation with relevant trade unions and the works councils of the company. 
Moreover, the union confederation can nominate a fifth member who may neither be 
an employee of the firm nor a member of the union. The employers’ side also has to 
nominate such a member. The idea behind is that these members of the supervisory 
board should represent the external public interest. Both of them do not stand alone 
on the supervisory board because the capital and the labour side have to agree on a 
neutral eleventh member. The appointed and nominated members of the supervisory 
board are elected by the general shareholders’ meeting. Besides, the labour side on 
the supervisory board can utilise a veto right over the appointment of a labour direc-
tor as a member of the management board. The labour director acts as a representa-
tive of the employees’ interests on the management board.  
Nowadays only 50 German steel and coal companies with ca. 500.000 employees 
still exist covered by this regulation because of the decline of these industrial sectors. 
Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the significance this regulation exerted 
on the German system of industrial relations (Müller-Jentsch 2003: 42): The equal 
representation of shareholders and employees on the supervisory board fostered a 
culture of joint decision-making in this relevant industrial sector whereby efficiency 
and social equity were balanced after World War II. Co-determination in steel and 
coal industries became a nucleus of the so-called ‘social partnership’ in Germany, 
also overcoming the previous strong resistance to trade unions and an autocratic 
management in these industries. With the labour director a hybrid institution in the 
German system of industrial relations was created, because he is on the one hand 
supported by trade unions and on the other hand he has to take account of share-
holder interests as a member of the management board. Role conflicts often are in-
evitable, but this dual role enables labour directors to act as peacekeepers and inter-
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est mediators at company level. Moreover, the co-determination act of 
1951 strengthened the power-position of works councils because of their options to 
influence corporate governance as members of the supervisory board.  
The second type of co-determination at company level is defined by the Works Con-
stitution Act of 1952 which provides only for a one-third representation of employees 
on the supervisory board in private sector companies with more than 500 employees 
outside the coal and steel industries. This act was opposed by the trade unions be-
cause it restricted their influence on corporate governance and their access to estab-
lishments. 
In 1976 the „Co-determination Act“ was legally codified by the German government 
and parliament. Both of employer associations and trade unions opposed initially to 
the Co-determination Act. Employer associations regarded the act as an extension of 
representative employee participation on the supervisory board in comparison with 
the provisions of the Works Constitution Act of 1952. Trade unions criticised above all 
provisions which enabled a shareholder majority. This regulation can be described as 
a further step to the extension of co-determination outside of the coal and steel in-
dustries. But it departed in some significant aspects from the Coal and Steel Co-
determination Act of 1951: According to the Co-determination Act the chair person of 
the supervisory board is appointed by the shareholder side. In case of disagreement 
between capital and labour sides on the supervisory board, the chair person can util-
ise a casting vote despite notional parity. In practise this leads to shareholder major-
ity. Furthermore, at least one employee representative has to be elected from the 
ranks of the executive staff („leitende Angestellte“), i.e. staff members who exercise 
management functions. The personnel director obtains the same status as the other 
members of the management board. Members of the management board are ap-
pointed if they gain a two-thirds majority of the votes by the supervisory board. This 
weaker type of co-determination embraces nearly 700 large companies with more 
than 2.000 employees. This means that circa 20 per cent of all employees in Ger-
many work for firms which are subject to this regulation (cf. Dombois 2001: 137; 
Müller-Jentsch 2003: 43). An evaluation study of the Co-determination Act carried out 
by the Centre for Social Research (sfs) in Dortmund in 1986 explained that the non-
parity co-determination on the supervisory board at least fostered the trade unions’ 
labour policy indirectly (Bamberg et al. 1987). For example, co-determination in-
creased the level of information about corporate strategies and supported the interest 
representation of employees in cases of rationalisation processes. This support re-
sulted from the representation of works councillors on the supervisory board. Addi-
tionally, works councillors on the supervisory board can exert influence on decision-
making processes in respect both to the appointment of members of the manage-
ment board and the fixation of salaries of management board members. Therefore, 
the conclusion can be drawn, that the co-determination act of 1976 is often utilised as 
a „supplementary mechanism for the works councils“ (Müller-Jentsch 2003: 44).  
3.2 Co-determination at the Establishment Level 
The historical roots of works councils date back to the German Empire even before 
1914. In a historical perspective four trajectories of works councils can be distin-
guished: The first historical basis of the evolution of works councils consists in a legal 
initiative by the Frankfurt Parliament of the later failed German revolution of 1848. 
This initiative intended to install plant councils, in which employers and elected em-
ployee representatives should be obliged to joint decision-making on establishment-
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related issues. The initiative also included the establishment of so-called 
‘factory-councils’ on district level, which should be elected by plant councils (Was-
sermann 2002). 
The second trajectory of the development of works councils refers to worker councils 
as in-company bodies created voluntarily by patriarchal employers in order to inte-
grate the workforce and pacify work-related conflicts at the establishment level. The 
establishment of worker councils was legally ensured by the „Workers Protection Act“ 
of 1891 which also obliged employers to set up works orders in establishments with 
at least 20 employees. These worker councils disposed of consultation rights in re-
spect to in-company procedures, as e.g. in working time, breaks, behavioural norms 
at the workplace, penalties, and the administration of social security funds at com-
pany level (ibid: 20).  
The third trajectory rests on the social movement of spontaneously formed revolu-
tionary worker and soldier councils in 1918/19 who strived for legal acceptance. 
However, free trade unions as well as the social democratic and communist wings of 
the labour movement were sceptical of independent revolutionary worker councils.  
The fourth historical trajectory is linked with German trade unions and their interest to 
establish a union representation at the establishment-level (Schmidt/Trinczek 1999: 
104). Until World War I access to the establishment-level was blocked to trade unions 
by legal provisions and by internal disputes among the dispersed German trade un-
ion movement.   
These different historical trajectories moulded interdependently in the legal codifica-
tion of the so-called „Works Council Act“ of 1920 initiated by a social-democratic gov-
ernment during the Weimar Republic. The Works Councils Act laid the fundaments of 
today’s employee representation at establishment level. Works councils were more or 
less a compromise between business friendly worker councils and revolutionary 
worker councils. On the one hand the rights of works councils compared to business 
friendly worker councils were extended. On the other hand - compared to revolution-
ary councils - the revolutionary edge was cut off by the legal obligation of works 
councils to take account of the economic situation of an establishment. Therefore, 
the conclusion can be drawn that works councils turned out to be a hybrid institution, 
which did neither meet the expectations of the social movement of revolutionary 
workers’ and soldiers’ councils nor the trade unions’ nor the employer associations’ 
interests. Indeed, the works councils act conveyed the interest of the state to balance 
different social interests and to eschew class struggle between labour and capital 
(Schmidt/Trinczek 1991: 104-105). Trade unions intended to functionalise works 
councils to focus on the control and supervision of legal provisions and the imple-
mentation of collective bargaining agreements at the establishment level. Employers 
did not object to the informal influence of trade unions on works councils despite their 
overall rejection of the Works Council Act. They regarded the union influence as a 
kind of “taming of the tigers” which could decrease the affiliation of works councils to 
revolutionary soldier or worker councils (cf. Müller-Jentsch 2003a: 461).   
The Works Councils Act of 1920 embraced private and public establishments with at 
least 20 employees. In smaller plants - instead of a works council - a works spokes-
man could be elected by employees. The act did not provide co-determination rights 
to works councils but rights of consultation in social matters, as e.g. agreements on 
wages, works orders and the administration of pensions. In personnel affairs works 
councils were allowed to exercise weaker veto- and consultation rights. For example, 
employers had to involve works councils in order to prevent social hardship related to 
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dismissals or rationalisation. In respect to economic affairs works councils only ob-
tained rights of information and consultation, such as to claim information about the 
economic situation of an establishment (cf. Wassermann 2002). This overview of 
works councils’ rights illustrates that their range of action still prevails in regulations 
on works councils in the Federal Republic of Germany. Moreover, the works councils 
act of 1920 paved the way for nowadays dual structure of interest representation in 
German industrial relations by the delegation of collective agreements solely to trade 
unions and employer associations. 
The works councils act of 1920 can be regarded as a significant step to transform a 
more or less feudal structure of establishments characterised by a strong military like 
and hierarchical organisation and nearly unlimited power of employers. Insofar it 
opened up a perspective of industrial citizenship based on joint decision-making by 
employers and works councils. Notwithstanding, this first legal institutionalisation of 
works councils was rather weak in terms of today’s works councils: Meetings of 
works councils and of the entire workforce had to take place during the free time of 
employees. The works councils act did not include a legal demand of exemption for 
works councillors within larger establishments. Works councillors’ tenure of office was 
limited to one year which complicated a continuous interest representation of em-
ployees. Furthermore, the election of works councils was rendered by competition 
among a variety of candidate lists each of them affiliated to another trade union 
(Wassermann 2002: 17-18). The national socialists abolished the works councils act 
after seizure of power by the introduction of a new law called „Act on the order of na-
tional labour“ in 1934. 
After World War II the institution of works councils was reintroduced by the Works 
Constitution Act of 1952 which referred to all private sector firms with at least five 
employees. The act stated that works councils were to be elected independently from 
trade unions and employers. German employer associations accepted the works 
constitution act promoted by a conservative-led multi-party government, whilst trade 
unions at first opposed to it because of the restriction of co-determination on the su-
pervisory boards of large companies and its limited coverage solely on private firms. 
Furthermore, they criticised the limited trade union access to establishments. How-
ever, trade unions adopted a pragmatic strategy, which rested on two pillars: Firstly, 
they invested in advice and training capacities for the recruitment of works councillors 
in order to secure trade union influence indirectly in establishments via unionised 
works councils. The second pillar was based on the development of a group-structure 
of union representatives (gewerkschaftliche Vertrauensleute) at the establishment 
level which focused on two different ends: One the one hand these union representa-
tives were meant to support the interest representation by works councils. On the 
other hand they should also direct the works councils’ orientation of action towards 
issues promoted by trade unions, therefore strengthening the influence of trade un-
ions on works councils (Müller-Jentsch 2003: 45).  
The reform of the Works Constitutions Act in 1972, introduced by the first socialde-
mocratic-liberal government, was especially opposed to by employers because it in-
troduced a broader spectrum of participation rights to works councils. However, this 
strengthened position of works councils legally codified an existing in-company prac-
tise is respect to workaday experience with the Works Constitution Act of 1952 at the 
establishment level, above all in larger companies.    
German governments and parliaments played an important role as interest mediator 
in the process of institutionalisation of works councils. They directed the institution of 
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works councils towards a „consensus- based agenda“ (Müller-Jentsch 2003: 
46). This meant that employers as well as trade unions had to make concessions in 
respect to their specific interests to works councils. The legally codified balanced 
agenda of works councils is a prerequisite for its high stability as an institution of 
German industrial relations. In the Federal Republic of Germany works councils are 
legally independent of employers and trade unions. They are elected democratically 
by the entire workforce for four years tenure of office (Jacobi et al. 1998: 211). The 
number of works councillors in a firm varies with the number of employees. In com-
panies with 200 and more employees a limited number of elected works councillors 
are allowed to act as full-time employees’ representatives. In large companies works 
councils have their own offices and staff at disposal (cf. Jacobi et al. 1998: 211 p.; 
Müller-Jentsch 2003a: 465). As an interest representation of the workforce works 
councils are not bound to any instructions of their voters but have to comply with the 
legal framework. They are obliged to carry out quarterly works meetings for all em-
ployees to report about works council activities. The works constitution act and other 
acts on co-determination guarantee the existence of works councils as a legal institu-
tion. Therefore, elected works councils are legally protected against any possible ini-
tiatives of trade unions or employers which might intend to abolish them. 
 3.3 Works Councils’ Rights and Obligations  
The works constitution act can be characterised as the primary legal framework of 
works councils in which their legal rights and obligations are fixed. According to this 
act works councils are obliged to co-operate with employers on grounds of mutual 
trust. Moreover, their action is bound to take account of the economic situation of an 
establishment. Works councils are not allowed to share commercial secrets with the 
workforce. Generally, works councils are prohibited to negotiate conflicting matters 
which are regulated in collective bargaining processes. This exclusion underscores 
the co-operative ‘lay-out’ of works councils fixed in the Works Constitution Act (Dom-
bois 2001: 139). Last but not least, works councils as well as employers have to 
comply with the so-called peace-obligation, i.e. strikes and lock-outs as means of 
industrial disputes are prohibited at establishment level.  
The works constitution act provides participation rights for works councils. In general, 
a distinction can be made in legal rights of co-determination, consultation and infor-
mation. Rights of co-determination imply a joint decision-making between employers 
and works councils. The latter can at least claim a veto-right in decision-making 
processes. Consultation requires an active involvement of works councils which en-
ables them to expound their perspectives on certain problems or decisions made by 
management. Works councils’ information rights oblige management to inform them 
about business activities or on a specified range of issues. These rights relate to dif-
ferent matters, i.e. in-company social policy, personnel issues and economic or fi-
nancial matters (cf. Müller-Jentsch 2003: 47-48; Jacobi et al.1998: 210-211). Works 
councils have at their disposal strong participation rights on social matters. For ex-
ample, they can utilise co-determination rights in respect to the in-company social 
policy which embraces different matters, such as the introduction of new payment 
methods, performance-related pay, principles of remuneration, regulation of over-
time- and short-time-working, and the implementation of new technologies designed 
to monitor employees’ performance. Compared to social matters the rights of works 
councils are weaker on personnel issues. Co-determination rights refer to personal 
matters, as e.g. dismissals and guidelines for recruitment and transfer. In respect to 
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individual staff movements works councils can also exercise veto rights, 
e.g. with regard to the transfer, dismissal and grading of employees. In matters of 
personnel planning, changes in the work process, jobs and work environment the 
rights of works councils are limited to information and consultation rights. Works 
councils can only utilise co-determination rights on changes of the work process, if 
these changes contradict to the established scientific findings of labour studies and 
are a special burden for employees, as e.g. in cases of higher psychological or 
physical stress related to new forms of work organisation.  
The more processes of economic decision-making are tackled the weaker are the 
rights of works councils. Therefore, works councils have only information rights at 
their disposal on financial or economic matters. According to the works constitution 
act the employer is obliged to inform work councils fully and in good time about the 
financial or economic situation of the establishment and about planned changes 
which may contradict to employees’ interests. In in-company workaday situations 
works councils often deliberately do not exercise their strong rights of co-
determination in exchange for the extension of their influence on matters in which 
they obtain only weaker legal rights (Müller-Jentsch 2003: 48). In sum, this combina-
tion of rights and obligations fosters the development of a „workplace bargaining cul-
ture based on co-operation and consensus“ (Dombois 2001: 139).  
3.3.1 Compromise by Works Agreements 
Works councils obtain the right to settle works agreements (Betriebsvereinbarungen) 
with the management of a company. The range of issues to be settled excludes mat-
ters which are regulated within the framework of collective agreements unless collec-
tive agreements include opening clauses which permit complementary works agree-
ments (Jacobi 2003: 29). Works agreements are contracts between employer and 
works councils at plant level in which quasi-legal norms which refer to the content, 
the beginning and the termination of the employer-employee-relationsship, in-
company related issues as well as matters in respect to the works constitution are 
settled. Works agreements may either rest on compromise between employer and 
works council as a result of negotiations or on arbitral award by the in-company set-
tlement-board being valid for the entire workforce of an establishment. Works agree-
ments may include norms or contents which improve working and employment condi-
tions beyond the employment contract concluded between a single employee and an 
employer. However, the principle of advantage (Günstigkeitsprinzip) is linked with 
employment contracts. This means that employment contracts may include agree-
ments from which an employee benefits more than from agreements fixed in works 
agreements. Works agreements have to comply with superior levels of legal norms, 
such as legal acts, employees’ rights or collective agreements.  
3.3.2 Conflict Resolution at the Establishment Level 
Compromise is often attained informally between employers and works councils in 
processes of social exchange. If both parties cannot agree on a disputed issue infor-
mally, an agreement can be concluded by a formal works agreement. Sometimes 
conflicts between the two parties even cannot be solved by a works agreement. Then 
a procedural solution on the basis of mediation is attainable. In this case an in-
company settlement board is constituted as a mutual collective body by employer 
and works council. Settlement boards mainly deal with procedural conflicts on ways 
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to shape working conditions. The settlement board consists equally of 
members of the employers’ side and of works councillors. Both sides have to agree 
on an independent chairperson who is often a labour judge. Decisions on the settle-
ment board can only be attained by majority vote. If an agreement between the two 
parties fails, decisions are made by the labour judge. Trying to convince the inde-
pendent member of the board, both sides have to gain the acceptance of the chair-
person. In this situation a strong force to compromise can be exercised by the inde-
pendent board member to resolve the conflict (see Müller-Jentsch 1997: 291 pp.). 
The settlement board and its procedures enhance the pressure both on employers 
and works council to compromise. Generally four different functions of a settlement 
board can be distinguished (ibid: 292-293): Firstly, the in-company parties may utilise 
the settlement board as an alibi in order to communicate a compromise in a better 
way towards the workforce. Secondly, the settlement board may function as conflict 
mediation in case of different interpretations of collective agreements and their in-
company implementation, as e.g. in cases of working time reduction. Thirdly, a set-
tlement board can reflect the power play between employer and works council. Fi-
nally, a settlement board enables both sides to solve a disputed matter, which could 
not be agreed on in previous negotiations and to which both parties paid high atten-
tion to.    
In Germany settlement boards are rarely set up, which hints at the consensual and 
co-operative work culture in many establishments. Nevertheless, there seem to be 
differences in the way works councillors in West and East Germany deal with settle-
ment boards. An empirical study carried out by the SOFI Göttingen illustrates that 
East German works councillors utilise settlement boards more pragmatically than 
their colleagues in West-Germany. The latter view settlement boards more or less as 
an ultima ratio of in-company conflict resolution whilst East German works councillors 
more often establish settlement boards as a means to conflict resolution without re-
garding them as a potential further step of conflict escalation (Kädtler et al. 1997: 172 
pp.).  
Finally, works councils and employers can appeal to labour courts to settle legal dis-
putes. Labour courts deal with legal disputes between employers and single employ-
ees related to the employment contract, conflicts between employers and works 
councils on matters of the works constitution, disputes between trade unions and 
employer associations in respect to matters of collective bargaining or the validity of a 
collective agreement.  
 
 
4. The Institutional Configuration of Works Councils 
German works councils can be characterised by a specific institutional configuration, 
which rests on the one hand on their legal framework and on the other hand on the 
way they interpret and act according to expectations and social norms affiliated with 
their role as works councillors. Hermann Kotthoff (1995: 430 pp.) distinguishes four 
formative principles of the institutional configuration in respect to German works 
councils: 
 
The Principle of Co-operation 
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According to the German Works Constitution Act works councils represent 
the labour force of an entire company or establishment and their unity. This represen-
tative function is not limited to its legal core, but refers also to the lifeworld or work 
culture of employees in a certain company or establishment. Contrary to the corpo-
rate culture concept, the work culture approach underscores „a lifeworld understand-
ing of organisations, according to which the culture of an organisation is produced 
and re-produced through the ongoing, interpretative action of its members. It is pro-
duced within the work process, it is plainly „work culture“ (Nagler et al. 1999: 4). In 
this view the dominant values and norms that govern the interaction of organisational 
members are produced and re-produced by the members themselves and relate to a 
specific enterprise, department, division of a company or to a certain status group. 
Work cultures are more influenced by habitual everyday interactions among 
organisational members than by corporate policies laid down in the official „corporate 
identity“. According to this lifeworld understanding of organisations the organisational 
culture and its different work cultures are expressed in the way, members „interpret 
and evaluate the responsibilities and requirements they are expected to fulfil, and 
how they translate these into behaviour“ (ibid). The lifeworld or work culture of 
employees also contains a set of expectations and perceptions of fairness and every 
day morality. The culture of an organisation therefore is to be understood as a form 
of processing that is manifested in established ‘sets’ of perception and action. 
Works councils represent the lifeworld or work culture of employees. Their specific 
task consists in safeguarding the recognition of their lifeworld, their standards and 
traditions in processes of economic goal attainment. According to Kotthoff works 
councils act in this case as a ‘good shepherd’ to protect employees and their life-
world. Moreover, works councils as representatives of the entire labour force are me-
diators in disputes between different groups of employees and take care of everyday 
problems of employees.  
The autonomy of works councils as representatives of the entire workforce implies 
that they have to act according to superior aspects instead of the interest representa-
tion of a certain group of employees. This orientation of action fosters the attribution 
of authority to works councils and a high grade of personalisation linked with their 
role as employee representatives. However, the representative function implies a 
specific risk because works councils often tend to represent core employees and to 
negate the interests of so called „fringe-employees“ or portfolio workers and free-
lancers. 
 
Recognition of Moral Standards 
Another relevant task of works councils consists in advocating the recognition of so-
cial and moral standards embedded in the in-company lifeworld of employees in op-
erational and decision-making processes. The legal framework of co-determination 
rights, especially with regard to social aspects and occupational health and safety, 
enables works councils to carry out this task. It creates an obligation of management 
to acknowledge the legitimacy of lifeworld demands. This legal framework restricts 
the range of management action, i.e. management has always to take account of the 
potential reaction of works councils in decision-making processes. 
Recognition of the Legitimacy of Economic Demands 
The Works Constitution Act includes a legal obligation of works councils to acknowl-
edge the legitimacy of economic demands. There are two different views this obliga-
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tion can be interpreted: In a defensive view it means that the lifeworld demands 
are restricted by economic demands. Contrary to this perspective, it may signify that 
works councils can contribute to the improvement of the competitiveness or produc-
tivity of a company by the integration of the social and moral resources of the in-
company lifeworld with economic demands. This alternative view takes into consid-
eration that works councils may not only exert influence on the work morale of em-
ployees, but function also as mediators and interpreters between „lifeworld and sys-
tem world“ - making use of a conceptual distinction by Habermas (1988). As mediator 
and interpreter works councils can on the one hand confront management with work-
related problems on the shop floor. On the other hand works councils are able to im-
part or explain management decisions to employees. This might lead to an improved 
acceptance of management decisions within the entire workforce. Furthermore, 
works councils may act as a mediator between several groups of employees or dif-
ferent departments.   
Social Exchange between Works Councils and Management 
The last but not least formative principle refers to the prevailing modus of interaction 
between works councils and management. It can be characterised as social ex-
change. Contrary to economic exchange, which fosters processes of distributive bar-
gaining, social exchange advocates an integrative bargaining between management 
and works councils at company- or establishment-level. Integrative bargaining is 
dominated by the search for win-win-solutions and the mutual intention to sustain co-
operation by the involved parties or actors (see also Löffler/Soffsky 1986: 21 p). Con-
cessions of one party will be answered by concessions of the other party in an un-
specified time span. The resolution of conflicts is based on compromise and under-
standing.  
Social exchange rests on a bilateral give and take, which is neither highly specified 
nor carried out in a formalised manner. Moreover, sometimes a considerable lack of 
time may exist between give and take. In processes of social exchange the giving 
party or actor places trust in the receiving party or actor that the latter will provide a 
return service in future. If the receiving actor provides with a return service a basis of 
mutual trust-relationship is laid. Therefore, social exchange contributes to a relation-
ship of mutual trust and loyalty. In processes of social exchange the content of ex-
change cannot not be standardised or regulated because it rests on voluntary deci-
sions and actions. Contrary to economic exchange, the content of social exchange is 
not an integral part of treaties or formal works agreements. Social exchange at a 
company- or establishment level requires a stable relationship between management 
and works councils and a highly personalised interaction, i.e. a good relationship be-
tween management and works councillors.             
 
5. The Relationship between Works Councils and Trade Unions 
In Germany trade unions and works councils are legally independent from each 
other. This independence is also reflected in the division of labour between both of 
the institutional actors (Müller-Jentsch 2003: 49): Trade unions specialise on distribu-
tive bargaining in the arena of collective bargaining which includes strike as a legal 
means of industrial dispute. Works councils deal with forms of integrative, i.e. con-
sensus-oriented bargaining which rests on co-determination at company or estab-
lishment level. This division of labour directs the action of trade unions towards is-
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sues at a highly aggregated level, above all wages and working time. Works coun-
cils concentrate on the implementation and adaptation of collectively agreed norms 
on the establishment or workplace level (Dombois 2001: 141). This division of labour 
contributes to a mutual relief of trade unions and works councils by concentrating on 
their specific functions and tasks (Schmidt/Trinczek 1999: 180):  
Despite this legal independence and the division of labour between both social actors 
their relationship can be characterised as symbiotic. The reasons why is on the one 
hand the consulting and co-ordinating functions trade unions exercise with regard to 
works councils. For example, new challenges to works councils, such as the imple-
mentation of team work or new technologies, cannot be met alone by works councils. 
Therefore, they demand for the support and advice of trade unions to better cope 
with new challenges at the establishment or workplace level. The advice and consul-
tancy provided by trade unions enhances the representation of trade unions among 
works councils. In Germany three out of four works councillors belong to any of the 
DGB-affiliated trade unions, thus creating zones of trade union influence at the work-
place level.  
On the other hand works councils form the backbone of an active trade union mem-
bership. They play an important role for the recruitment of new trade union members 
and the financial resources to trade unions because the establishment level still pre-
vails as the most important recruitment basis for trade union membership (cf. Müller-
Jentsch 2003: 50; Schmidt/Trinczek 1999: 180). The importance of the plant level 
was enhanced by the fact that many a German trade union retreated from organising 
trade union members at the levels of local communities or quarters. Moreover, trade 
unions depend on works councils in order to mobilise union members at the plant 
level in order to support collective bargaining efforts. The mobilising function of works 
councils contains two dimensions: Firstly, works councils may mobilise union mem-
bers at the establishment level for the goals of trade unions in collective bargaining 
processes and strengthen their collective bargaining power by means of industrial 
disputes, such as strikes or warning strikes. Secondly, works councils play a crucial 
role in the mobilisation of trade union membership support for the acceptance of re-
sults which were settled in collective agreements between unions and employers’ 
associations. In this perspective works councils are as well mediators between trade 
unions and their membership as social buffers in both directions (Schmidt/Trinczek 
1999: 180). For example, in the winter of 2003/2004 the IG Metall failed to introduce 
the 35-working-hour-week in East German collective bargaining processes because 
of a lack of support by trade union members and works councils.  
Trade unions gained an at least limited admission to plant level according to the 
Works Constitution Act (Müller-Jentsch 1997: 277): Trade unions, which are repre-
sented in an establishment by at least one member among employees, obtain the 
right to initiative to elect a works council and to call in workshop meetings (Be-
triebsversammlungen). Moreover, trade unions have the right to participate in work-
shop meetings and meetings of works councils. Additionally, they can utilise their 
right to monitor the election of works councils. This also includes the option to contest 
the validity of the election in the case of irregularities. Trade unions are allowed to 
apply for a removal of works councillors who violate against the legal framework of 
works constitution. Trade unions may also apply for the punishment of an employer 
restricting or preventing the election of a works council or the action of works council-
lors.         
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Last but not least German trade unions tried to safeguard their influence on the 
establishment level directly by the establishment of trade union representatives („Ver-
trauensleute“), which should carry out a dual task: On the one hand they were to 
support the actions of works councils, whilst on the other hand they should prevent 
them from neglecting trade union interests in favour of establishment interest (Müller-
Jentsch 2003: 45). According to the Works Constitution Act trade union members can 
exert their right to vote a body of trade union representatives at plant level. Generally 
spoken, a trade union representative is elected for 30 up to 50 employees. These 
trade union representatives carry out service functions for their trade union, as e.g. 
the distribution of trade union information among the workforce. The once intended 
strategy of trade unions to establish a stronghold of their own at the plant level often 
fails because the body of in-company trade union representatives is often controlled 
by works councils, i.e. leadership of this body is often carried out by works council-
lors. Notwithstanding, trade union representatives should not be regarded as a ‘tooth-
less paper tiger’ because in times of disturbed relationships between trade unions 
and works councils they may emerge at the plant level as a competitive body to 
works councils (Schmidt/Trinczek 1991: 182). Then trade union representatives may 
for example form an alternative list of candidates in works councils’ elections and 
may win the elections replacing the former works council.    
With regard to Norbert Elias the relationship between trade unions and works coun-
cils can be described as an interdependent figuration (cf. Elias 1993) characterised 
by an uneven balance of power in favour of works councils: Trade unions do not con-
tain power of sanctions towards legally independent works councils. Moreover, trade 
unions depend more on works councils than vice versa. Works councils are able to 
carry out their job even without a strong affiliation to trade unions, whilst the latter 
depend highly on the co-operation of works councils to attain their goals. If works 
councils reject a co-operation with trade unions the influence of trade unions on the 
establishment level will diminish. Additionally, because of their intermediary character 
works councils often tend to prefer establishment interests in relation to trade union 
interests (Schmidt/Trinczek 1991: 181). 
 
 
6. The Distribution of Works Councils in the German Economy  
The institutional relevance of works councils as a pillar of the German industrial rela-
tion systems depends on their distribution among branches, regions and companies. 
At first glance the distribution of works councils should not be a significant issue in 
German industrial relations because works councils are mandatory in private firms 
with at least five employees according to the Works Constitution Act, but in fact 
works councils do not exist in many firms the legal provisions are valid for3.   
The distribution of works councils in Germany varies with regions: According to the 
establishment panel study of the Institute of Employment Research (IAB) nearly 50 
per cent of employees in private-sector establishments with at least five employees 
                                                
3 In 1998 ca. 200.000 works councillors were elected in 36.000 firms in Germany. The high share of employee 
participation in elections of works councillors is about 75 per cent (Müller-Jentsch 2003a: 462 p.). 
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were represented by elected works councils in the western part of Germany 
in 2002. The statistical figures illustrate even a minor interest representation of em-
ployees by works councils in East Germany, where only four out of ten employees in 
private establishments with five or more employees are represented by works coun-
cils. The IAB-panel also shows a decline of interest representation by works councils 
in the eastern as well as in the western part of Germany between 1996 and 2002. 
The percentage of employees represented by works councils declined slightly about 
0.5 per cent in the west during this period of time, whilst the decrease in the eastern 
part was more severe with about nearly two per cent (Müller-Jentsch/Weitbrecht 
2003: 197).  This stronger decline in works councils’ representation of employees can 
be explained by the relatively higher number of plant closures during the 1990ies, the 
shorter tradition and the weaker power position of trade unions in East Germany 
compared to western parts of Germany.   
‘Size matters’ in respect to the distribution of works councils: they are underrepre-
sented in small and medium-sized firms. Especially in smaller establishments with 
less than 100 employees works councils often do not exist4. This gap of interest rep-
resentation is above all severe in establishments with five to 20 employees because 
only in 6.2 per cent of these companies works councils were established. Therefore, 
researchers on labour relations conclude that smaller businesses are often co-
determination-free zones in Germany (cf. Abel/Ittermann 2003; Wassermann 2002). 
The IAB- panel-study shows that the percentage of companies with works councils is 
especially low in companies with less than 50 employees (Müller-Jentsch 2003: 54).  
Contrary to smaller firms, larger companies are strongholds of employees’ represen-
tation by works councils: The IAB-panel illustrates that only companies with 100 and 
more employees belong to the „core zone of German industrial relations“, i.e. in most 
of these companies works councils and valid collective agreements exist (Wasser-
mann 2002: 79). Works councils were established in circa 98 per cent of the compa-
nies with more than 1000 employees.  
Abel and Ittermann (2003: 105) come to the following conclusion about the reasons 
for a weak distribution of works councils in small and medium-sized companies: “As a 
rule, the probability that a works council will either be established or already exists 
increases with the number of employees, the age of the company, and the differen-
tiation of the management level. Further factors are the location of the business (re-
gions with a long union tradition) and the union density rate; the lower the involve-
ment is, the more improbable the foundation of works councils becomes”. 
Moreover, many smaller companies are characterised by a specific organisational 
culture, which feature is often an informal and direct communication between em-
ployees and employers on grounds of trust and consent. The social exchange be-
tween employers and employees reflects the interdependence of both parties and is 
reproduced by mutual expectations: Whilst owners or employers expect flexibility, 
commitment, reliability and a high work quality of employees, the latter expect from 
                                                
4 In Germany 98 per cent of all firms are small businesses with 100 or less employees covering 53 per cent of the 
entire labour force, whilst nearly a quarter of the labour force is employed in companies with more than 500 em-
ployees. The share of these large companies among businesses in Germany is only 0.24 per cent (Abel/Ittermann 
2003: 104). 
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employers to guarantee their employment by the acquisition of orders 
and autonomy at work. A formal representation of employee interests by works coun-
cils appears to be neither necessary nor wanted because of direct communication 
and forms of informal participation of employees (cf. Kotthoff/Reindl 1990). Further-
more, the leadership culture in many a smaller and traditional firm matters (Becke 
2001). Several studies hint at the paternalistic self-image of employers which often 
contradicts to a formal interest representation of employees. It is based on the em-
ployer’s conviction that she or he takes account of the interest of employees who be-
long to the “firm-family”. In this view an interest representation of employees by 
works councils seems superfluous (cf. Brüggemann/Riehle 1995; Becke 2001; Sen-
nett 1985; Staehle 1999). 
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7. New Challenges to the Institution of Works Councils 
Since the 1990ies the German system of industrial relations has undergone a shift, in 
which its foundations have in some respect changed drastically. This change also 
counts for the institution of works councils. In this chapter I would like to point out the 
new challenges to the institution of works councils which arose especially during the 
1990ies.  
7.1 The Change from Industrial to (new) Service Sectors 
The institution of works councils is confronted with an increase of so-called „co-
determination-free zones“. These are companies, „which do not have legally secured 
co-determination in the form of works or staff councils and/or employee representa-
tives on the supervisory board“ (Abel/Ittermann 2003: 103). According to a study of 
the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Hans-Böckler-Foundation the percentage of co-
determination-free zones rose from ca. 51 per cent in 1984 to 60.5 per cent of com-
panies in the German private sector in 1996 (Bertelsmann Stiftung/Hans-Böckler-
Stiftung 1998: 52-54). During the same period of time the percentage of employees 
working in private companies with works councils decreased from 51 per cent to 42 
per cent. This decline was especially attributed to the stagnation of the number of 
works councils between 1990 and 1994 in East Germany despite an increase in the 
number of companies (Wassermann 2002: 77).  
The decrease in employee-representation at the establishment level can be partly 
explained by sectoral economic change. The 1990ies were marked by a severe 
structural economic change, which is characterised by an ongoing decline in manu-
facturing industries and an expansion of the service economy. Structural changes in 
traditional industrial sectors during the past 20 years were accompanied by the clo-
sure of plants, the transfer of employment to so-called ‘low wage countries’ and the 
decline of entire industries in Germany, such as large parts of the steel-or mining in-
dustry or textile and clothing industry. These traditional industrial sectors – with the 
exception of the textile and clothing industry - formed for decades the backbone of 
co-determination. Since the end of the 1980ies the number of works councils de-
creased in these strongholds of co-determination (ibid: 75). Because of these struc-
tural changes the representation of employees’ interests by works councils dimin-
ished in traditional industrial sectors.  
Besides, the structural economic change is marked by a growth of the service sector. 
For instance, the percentage of employees working in the service sector among the 
entire labour force rose between 1980 and 1997 from 49 per cent to 63.4 per cent in 
West Germany (Willke 1999: 55). This trend is on the one hand attributed to the rise 
of the so-called ‘new economy’ which is characterised by symbol-processing knowl-
edge work, and on the other hand to personal services, above all in nursing and child 
rearing (Bandemer et. al. 1998: 413 pp.). In the private service sector the number of 
employees increased between 1984 and 1998 from nearly 9.5 million to 15.65 million. 
During the same period of time the number of works councils in companies of the 
private service sector rose only slightly from 8836 to 9000 works councils (Wasser-
mann 2002: 76). Especially, in start-up companies of the new economy, which are 
not affiliated to any of the old economy companies or networks, the traditional institu-
tions of German industrial relations are hardly spread, i.e. they are characterised by 
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an absence of collective agreements and works councils and a low profile on trade 
union membership among employees (Gesterkamp 2002). A study on forms of par-
ticipation and co-determination in companies with shares quoted on the stock ex-
change of Nemax underscores this tendency. It illustrates that only in 18 per cent of 
the Nemax-companies a works council was founded (Kipker/Potthoff 2000). The dis-
tribution of works councils focused mainly on call centres, firms with shift operation or 
with a high relevance of mechanical production. Kipker and Potthoff found out that in 
many Nemax-companies informal forms of co-determination or participation were 
practised which were based on information and personnel meetings, round tables, 
forms of mentoring and coaching and the utilisation of intranet-platforms or electronic 
media (ibid.: 21).   
Some German industrial relations researchers support the hypothesis of a conver-
gence of co-determination and interest representation in the ‘old economy’ and the 
‘new economy’. They are of the opinion that in some years the dual structure of inter-
est representation will be established and reproduced even in the digital economy 
(see e.g. Streeck 2002). In this view the current economic crisis of the ‘new economy’ 
fosters the development of the dual structure of interest representation5. Employees 
of the new economy are now confronted with a higher risk of unemployment and a 
decline in income and shares. According to the convergence hypothesis employees 
in the digital economy will question their prevailing individual representation of inter-
ests at the workplace. In this view the crisis of the new economy opens up space for 
an institutionalised co-determination. Recent studies on forms of co-determination 
within the new economy show that the crisis as well as the professionalisation and 
institutionalisation of companies of the new economy walk along with an increase of 
employee demands in respect to regulated working conditions and organised forms 
of interest representation (for an overview see Abel/Ittermann 2003: 114-115). An 
empirical study carried out after the breakdown of the new economy market indicates 
that in the meantime works councils were spread in 40 per cent of the 300 Nemax-
companies, most of them were newly elected or founded (cf. Müller-Jentsch 2003a). 
However, recent studies also show, that alternative forms of participation or co-
determination prevail compared to the establishment of works councils (cf. Städtler et 
al. 2004: 154; Müller-Jentsch 2003a: 470). Moreover, works councils are mainly 
founded in larger firms of the digital economy being threatened in existence or ex-
pecting a wave of dismissals (Städtler et al. 2004).  
In the diverse service sector of the new economy differences in the distribution of 
works councils can be observed. The distribution of works councils varies between 
start up- or start up-grown companies and firms which are subsidiaries of larger 
companies of the so-called old economy. In other words, corporate culture matters, 
i.e. parent companies of the old economy with its tradition of institutionalised and le-
gally codified forms of co-determination exert influence on their outsourced or newly 
                                                
5 During the 1990ies the new economy with its different segments was one of the service sectors which employ-
ment figures expanded rapidly. For instance, employment in the segment of IT, telecommunication and new media 
expanded between 1998 and 2000 from 710.000 employees to 820.000 employees (Abel/Ittermann 2003: 112). In 
the meantime, the economic situation in the new economy changed. This new service sector is now facing an 
economic crisis, which is marked by a stagnation or decline in employment – with the exception of the segment IT- 
and software-services.  
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founded subsidiaries to adapt these forms of co-determination including 
works councils (see Boes/Baukrowitz 2002). In small and medium sized start-up or 
start up-grown companies, which are not related to a larger corporate company with 
institutionalised and legally codified forms of interest representation, works councils 
can hardly be found. Besides, an individual representation of interests at the work-
place and a self-image of organisational members as being part of the ‘company-
family’ prevails (cf. ibid; Abel/Ittermann 2003). This comparison illustrates that the 
institution of works councils failed to gain advantage of the rise of the service econ-
omy, especially in small and medium-sized businesses of the new economy. More-
over, it illustrates that there exists a broader variety of participation, from informal or 
management-induced forms of participation to legally codified co-determination in the 
service sector, especially the new economy. This variety of forms of participation and 
interest representation contradicts to the convergence hypothesis because it ques-
tions its implication that institutionalised forms of participation and co-determination 
will even prevail in the digital economy.  
Moreover, the convergence hypothesis negates the relevance of employees’ different 
patterns of action and cognitive maps. This especially refers to highly qualified sala-
ried employees in the digital economy. These employees who form a relevant part of 
knowledge workers in the new economy, display an attitude of retention or even re-
jection towards the institutions of works councils and unions (Städtler et al. 2004): 
One of the reasons why is the implicit psychological contract between this group of 
employees and their employers. The psychological contract rests on mutual expecta-
tions: Employers expect high loyalty, flexibility, quality and commitment of employ-
ees, whilst the highly qualified employees in return expect positive incentives, as e.g. 
high wages and/or forms of profit sharing, status and career options, as well as 
autonomy at work. Their self-image is based on consensus orientation and confi-
dence in their self-assertion (cf. Kotthoff 1997; Baethge et al. 1995). Highly qualified 
employees are self-determined and often prefer an individual representation of their 
interests at the workplace. Furthermore, they appeal to new management concepts 
which offer them participation at the workplace and demanding jobs. Because of their 
self-assertion and their self-image as „quasi-entrepreneurs“, i.e. being part of the 
management, they seldom seek advice offered by works councils or trade unions 
(Abel/Ittermann 2003: 106). Among new forms of participation the financial participa-
tion in shares of the company played an important role enhancing the self-image of 
employees as quasi-entrepreneurs and shareholders of ‘their’ company. Turning em-
ployees into shareholders may lead to a change of perspectives: From a shareholder 
perspective one may emphasise the common ground, i.e. the confluence of interests 
between the employer side and employees. In this view an interest representation by 
works councils seemed unnecessary (Gesterkamp 2002: 79). 
In face of these empirical findings the convergence hypothesis can be rejected be-
cause the economic crisis did not trigger a foundation wave of works councils or an 
increase in union membership in the digital economy as a reaction to economic crisis. 
Therefore, the variety of branches in the digital economy, the different social contexts 
of firms and the diversity of employees’ action patterns have to be taken account of. 
In case of highly qualified salaried works it seems doubtful whether the economic 
crisis will alter their stable patterns of action and professional identity (cf. Städtler et 
al. 2004). However, works councils and unions might be established in the long run in 
the digital economy, if they undergo processes of strategic and institutional learning. I 
will turn to this point later.   
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7.2 Increased Labour Force Diversity in the German 
Economy 
New challenges to works councils as well as to trade unions arise from the altered 
social composition of the workforce in the German economy. First of all, I would like 
to sketch the enhanced workforce diversity. In a second step specific challenges to 
works councils caused by diversity are discussed. Workforce diversity refers to a va-
riety of social aspects, such as e.g. class, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, race, 
age, qualification and social status. The attention paid to workforce diversity is attrib-
uted to the consideration that processes of social change effect the social composi-
tion of a nation’s labour force in terms of increased social differentiation. Its focal 
point of reference is the industrial society of the 19th and 20th century in many west-
ern societies, which was characterised for a long period of time by a more or less 
stable social stratification, the establishment of a male-dominated standard employ-
ment relationship and a value-orientation of blue collar workers and public service 
sector employees which highlighted solidarity reflected by trade union membership 
and support of industrial action. These core features are closely tied to fordism as 
prevailing social pattern of regulation in industrial societies.  
As shown in the last chapter the sectoral change from industrial to service economies 
went along with an altered social composition of the workforce of the German econ-
omy characterised by a decline in blue collar workers and an increase in salaried 
employees who display a comparatively higher degree of retention towards the insti-
tutions of works councils and trade unions and give priority to self-representation over 
representative forms of interest representation. Moreover, class identities lost their 
relevance as focal points of social identity in processes of social change and social 
individualisation, whilst a variety of social milieus emerged (cf. Beck 1992; Geiling 
2001). Processes of social individualisation foster a diversification of life styles and 
value-orientations. In contrast to social individualisation trade unions and works 
councils still often refer to a more traditional image of the ‘normal employee’ which is 
affiliated to fordism.  
This image of the ‘normal employee’ is also reflected by the male-dominated stan-
dard employment relationship, which is characterised by a “continuous full-time em-
ployment for life with increasing rights to social protection” (Dombois 2001: 158). Al-
though the standard employment relationship contains a staying normative power as 
a pillar of the German social insurance system and as a relevant social construction, 
it is weakened by recent labour market developments and social change. On the one 
hand an increasing number of male employees are confronted with precarious forms 
of employment and a fragmentation of work-related careers by periods of unemploy-
ment and the necessity of professional reorientation (cf. Matthies et al. 1994). On the 
other hand female employment has been rising not only in Germany but globally de-
spite an increase in mass employment in many European societies (cf. Castells 
2001; Kohli 2000)6. In Germany this change in female employment can be illustrated 
by the typical development of labour force participation (ibid: 345): In 1957 the labour 
                                                
6 According to OECD-statistics the average labour force participation rate of women increased from 
48.3 per cent in 1973 to 61.6 per cent in 1993 in OECD-states. In the same period the labour force 
participation rate of men fell from 88.2 per cent to 81.3 per cent (Castells 2001: 159).  
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force participation rate of women declined sharply in early adulthood, i.e. 
after marriage and / or giving birth to children. In 1992 a different pattern of female 
labour market participation was observed: Women’s labour force participation rate 
remained on a relative high level (over 60 per cent) throughout their adulthood until 
retirement. Their labour force participation curve included a second peak which 
hinted at a re-entry into labour market after the period of child rearing. The high rate 
of part-time employment among women indicates their interest in balancing work and 
family7. Differences in female labour force participation between the 1950ies and the 
1990ies do not only reflect a change in the social composition of the entire labour 
force, but also a social-cultural change: women questioned the repressive patriarchal 
family model which legitimised male domination on the privilege as sole family pro-
vider restricting the spectre of women’s activity to home work, child rearing and car-
ing (cf. Castells 2001; Nunner-Winkler 2000)8. Therefore, the increase in female em-
ployment can be attributed to stronger work-orientation of women. In this perspective 
social inclusion in labour market cannot solely be explained by women’s intention to 
contribute to the household budget, but rather as a means to self-realization or self-
development and as a basis for an autonomous life, often providing women with a 
variety of social contacts and social recognition at work by colleagues (cf. Hochschild 
2002; Nave-Herz/Onnen-Isemann 2000). A further increase in female employment, 
as e.g. in the expanding service sector, confronts works councils with enhanced de-
mands to develop gender sensible strategies and to integrate gender democracy into 
their agenda of action. Otherwise, works councils might lose social legitimacy, at 
least among female employees.          
New challenges to works councils result from demographic change towards an ‘age-
ing German society’, which can roughly be characterised by a decline in birth rates 
on the one hand and rising life expectancy attributed to a higher level of medical care 
and an improved general standard of living on the other hand.9 The largest age group 
which will benefit from an increased average life expectancy is the so-called ‘baby 
boomer generation’ who outnumbers the age group of people who are over 60 years 
old today as well as age groups who are younger than the baby boomer generation. 
This leads to an accelerated ageing of population within the next 30 up to 50 years 
                                                
7 Among the female labour force in the German economy 30 per cent work part-time, whilst this counts 
only for three per cent of the male labour force in 1998 (Kohli 2000: 379). 
8 The number of private households which are dominated by the model of the male sole family pro-
vider declined. In 1997 the male family provider model existed only in one out of three households in 
western parts of Germany and in a quarter of the entire private households in eastern parts of Ger-
many. However, the increase of women in labour market participation rarely alters gender relations: 
Women are often confronted with a ‘second shift’ after work because their male partners seldom take 
on responsibility for reproductive activities, such as child rearing or housework (cf. Janczyk et al. 
2003: 13 p.)   
9 This tendency of an ‘ageing society’ in Germany can be illustrated by the comparison between the 
age groups of children (up to 14 years of age) and human beings with at least 65 years of age be-
tween 1910 and 1990: It is striking that 34 per cent of the entire population were children in 1910, 
whilst their share declined to 16 per cent in 1990. In the same time span the percentage of people 
who were 65 or more years old increased from 5 to 16 per cent (cf. Heinz 2001: 152 p.). Demographic 
prognoses forecast that until 2030 the average age of the German population will increase to 48 
years. In 2030 the percentage of people younger than 20 years old is estimated at 15 per cent, whilst 
the percentage of people older than 60 years is predicted to increase to 37 per cent (cf. ibid.: 153; 
Willke 1999: 209).   
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(Heinz 2001: 153). This general tendency of an ‘ageing society’ can only partly miti-
gated by an increase in immigration. Therefore, it can be predicted that the ‘ageing 
society’ will also walk along with an increasing average age of the workforce in the 
German economy. Due to a forecasted shortage of younger employees personnel 
policy or personnel management will have to adapt to demographic change and facili-
tate an ‘ageing workforce’ to cope with work-related demands by different programs 
and measures, such as work design, health promotion, age-oriented in-company ca-
reer and personnel planning, by investments in their ‘human capital’ and in training 
programs tailored to work-related experience of these employees (cf. Bröd-
ner/Klaßen-Kluger 1998; Spieß/Winterstein 1999). Despite this striking tendency of 
an ‘ageing society’ its implications for the future composition of the workforce in the 
German economy was paid relative little attention to by management as well as by 
works councils and trade unions.  
In 1957 retirement was fully established as a third phase in the span of life attributed 
to social policy in Germany, especially a dynamic rise of pensions, and to increased 
life expectancy. Therefore, pensioners were – compared to past generations – better 
equipped with financial resources and health questioning the for a long time prevail-
ing image of retirement as a phase of physical and mental decay (cf. Kohli 2000: 367; 
Heinz 2001: 162). However, the group of elder employees became a reservoir for so-
called ‘humane personnel reductions’ by companies in times of mass unemployment. 
This in-company labour market policy to reduce supply in labour was fostered by 
regulations on labour market policy which enabled – often financially attractive to 
older employees - early retirement schemes10 or opened up other institutional path-
ways. This labour market policy was supported by a ‘grand coalition’ which consisted 
of the state, trade unions and employer associations (Kohli 2000: 368). At the estab-
lishment level management and works councils formed a dominant coalition utilising 
on a relative broad scale regulations which advocated a ‘humane personnel reduc-
tion’. Feldman (2000: 189) points out the core idea linked with early retirement 
schemes: “The rationale behind this strategy is that if more older employees can be 
enticed to withdraw from the workforce voluntarily, fewer other employees will have to 
be laid off involuntarily”.              
The ‘ageing society’ entered not until recent years the public and political agenda 
focussing on financial problems the German social insurance system and social pol-
icy is going to face in the near future. Increased financial contributions to social in-
surance to be paid by employers and employees are regarded as a threat to the 
competitiveness of the ‘economic location Germany’ in times of enhanced economic 
globalisation. Public and political awareness of demographic change as ‘cost factor’ 
initiated regulations whereby the retirement insurance system was partly privatised 
and fees for medical care and services were to be paid by employees. However, the 
supply-side oriented labour market policy which was based on ‘humane personnel 
reductions’ led to some not-intended impacts: Early retirement schemes in private 
and public sectors enabled companies to externalise social costs of personnel reduc-
                                                
10 Besides early retirement incentives different forms of ‘bridge employment’ are practised in compa-
nies in order to enable older employees a smoother, gradual transition out of work instead of an 
abrupt leave. Although many older employees appreciated early retirement incentives, others opted 
for forms of ‘bridge employment’. In this case they withdraw from their long-term positions but carry 
out other tasks offering them opportunities to work with colleagues and in familiar in-company settings 
(cf. Feldman 2000: 189).     
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tions to the social insurance system; they also turned out to deepen public 
indebtedness (cf. Brödner/Klaßen-Kluger 1998). At the establishment level early re-
tirement incentives to shrink workforces and dismissals of elder employees in proc-
esses of restructuring often caused severe in-company knowledge problems, i.e. a 
loss of productive knowledge and a deteriorated mix of human resource skills and 
experience (Burke/Cooper 2000: 10): Older employees often controlled in-company-
‘zones of uncertainty’ (cf. Crozier/Friedberg 1979) which rested on their specific ex-
pertise, experience and tacit skills. Partly, they were not willing to share this knowl-
edge with younger employees because it constituted a power base they could rely on 
in order to protect their in-company social status or position. Partly, management and 
works councils underestimated the work-related knowledge older employees had ac-
quired and negated the necessity to establish forms of knowledge transfer between 
elder and younger employees. This case may also reflect a depreciation of older em-
ployees and their knowledge regarding them as not being capable to cope with new 
demands at the workplace (cf. Sennett 1998). 
The social composition of the workforce in the German economy will also change in 
terms of ethnicity and migration11. Germany is de facto one of the largest countries of 
immigration with its 7.3 million foreigners, i.e. 9 per cent of the entire population in 
Germany. The largest group of immigrants to Germany consists of Turkish people (2 
millions). The percentage of migrants among the labour force of the German econ-
omy is nearly the same. According to different prognoses it is forecasted that until 
2010 the number of migrants in Germany will increase to 15 millions accompanied by 
a decline of the entire population in Germany to 82.7 million people (Willke 1999: 
203). Therefore, it can be predicted that the share of migrant employees among the 
labour force of the German economy will also increase. In this case works councils 
will be confronted with enhanced demands of social integration. In their role as ‘good 
shepherds’ (Kotthoff 1995) works councils will have to enhance activities to safe-
guard migrant employees combating prejudice and discrimination against them at the 
establishment level. Moreover, as mediators between different groups of employees 
works councils will be challenged to promote intercultural co-operation and communi-
cation, which are also prerequisites to draw on cultural diversity as social resource for 
an improved competitiveness of firms.                
Until today, works councils and trade unions have rarely taken account of enhanced 
workforce diversity. This lack of awareness is reflected by their prevailing image of 
‘normal employees’, i.e. German male blue collar workers or male employees work-
ing in public or private service sectors (cf. Gesterkamp 2002). This image turns out to 
be problematic in several ways to works councils: Firstly, this lack of awareness re-
stricts works councils capability to fully draw on competences, skills and experience 
linked with specific groups of employees for processes of problem-solving and nego-
tiations at the establishment level. Secondly, to negate diversity can foster processes 
of alienation between works councils and specific groups of employees, especially if 
they and their competences or values are not acknowledged by works councils. 
Moreover, a lack of awareness regarding diversity limits works councils’ sensitivity to 
                                                
11 Gender matters also in respect to migration because 50 per cent of all migrants worldwide are 
women. Among the 120 million migrants worldwide ca. 100 million move to other countries to join their 
family members or to look for work. Since the 1960ies numbers of female labour migrants increased, 
whilst before labour migration was dominated by men, female migration often being filed under the 
category of family reunion (cf. Hochschild 2003: 18 p.)  
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in-company forms of discrimination. For instance, if works councils are not aware 
of gender related forms of discrimination they will not promote gender democracy or 
intend to break the informal ‘glass ceiling’ preventing female employees from gaining 
access to management ranks or abolishing gender related wage discrimination (cf. 
Meyerson/Fletcher 2002; Carl/Krehnke 1997). Therefore, by the neglect of diversity 
works councils might at least contribute unwillingly to social tensions at the estab-
lishment level stemming from processes of discrimination.    
7.3 Transformation of Companies 
Another important challenge to works councils arises from the emergence of the pro-
duction model of postfordism (cf. Dörre 2003; Boyer/Freyssenet 2003), which walks 
along with enhanced organisational change at the company and establishment level. 
First of all, the core features of postfordistic organisations are characterised. Next, 
their relevance to works councils is discussed. 
7.3.1 Diversity of Production Regimes 
Until the 1980ies the German economy was dominated by the production model of 
fordism which rested on a division of labour between larger companies concentrating 
on mass production backed by fordistic work processes and hierarchical organisa-
tional structures on the one hand and small and medium-sized businesses focussing 
on a highly specialised and flexible production on the other hand. The market econ-
omy of fordism was dominated by the supply side corresponding with a stable de-
mand for goods and services. Employees participated in economic growth via rising 
wages or salaries as a result of collective bargaining agreements. Higher wages were 
regarded as a compensation for alienating forms of work.  
During the 1980ies and the 1990ies the - in many branches prevailing - production 
model of fordism eroded in many respects in Germany (cf. Immerfall 1999; Dombois 
2001): The German unification was combined with extensive financial transfers by 
the state to improve the living conditions in East Germany, to support processes of 
industrial restructuring and to combat the high rate of unemployment in the eastern 
federal states. These financial transfers enhanced the public indebtedness, which 
was answered by a policy of cutting back public expenditures by German govern-
ments since then. Moreover, the German labour market faced an increase in mass 
unemployment on grounds of economic crises and economic rationalisation proc-
esses of companies as well as a spread of precarious employment relationships. To-
day there are more than four million unemployed in Germany. The high number of 
unemployed employees and the increase of economic competition shifted the bal-
ance of power between the social partners in favour of employers. The emergence of 
capitalist market structures in the former socialist countries of middle and eastern 
Europe  confronts parts of the German economy with an extensive competition on 
prices and costs, which partly walks along with the transfer of plants or production to 
the new market economies, as e.g. in textile industry. The creation of the common 
European Market enhanced economic competition for many German firms. Since the 
beginning of the 1990ies an expansion of economic internationalisation or globalisa-
tion can be observed linked with an extension of global trade on information, services 
and goods, an increase of financial and capital transactions and the emergence of 
new multinational companies by fusions and take-overs. Productivity, cost and price 
competition have been exerting a strong competitive pressure on social standards. 
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Moreover, the domination of the supply side in the market economy was in times 
of enhanced economic competition replaced by a demand-side domination, which is 
linked with an unstable and fluctuating demand of goods and services as well as with 
a growing importance of quality demands. 
This situation of enhanced economic competition fosters transformation processes of 
companies. A key feature of this transformation can be described as a disentangle-
ment of traditional boundaries of companies, which is based on the reorganisation of 
supply chains, as e.g. vertically integrated company networks in the automotive in-
dustry (cf. Sydow 1992; Ammon et al. 1996). Moreover, it rests on the build up of vir-
tual inter-company networks utilising new information and communication technolo-
gies in order to reduce costs via outsourcing and enhancing the competitiveness of 
different network partners by synergies of co-operation (Picot/Reichwald 1994). For 
instance, such virtual networks are a common form of co-operation in the new econ-
omy.  
A third strategy of the disentanglement of companies consists in the transformation of 
companies into network companies according to the new management philosophy 
‘small within big is beautiful’ (Wassermann 2002: 93). A network company is created 
by the outsourcing of organisational units as subsidiaries or the purchase or founda-
tion of other companies in order to integrate them into the network company (ibid.). 
Network companies are often organised by a holding structure as an umbrella or-
ganisation with a variety of subsidiaries which obtain a limited economic autonomy. 
Network companies are created in order to enhance the flexibility and competitive-
ness of corporations or companies to different markets or segments of markets. The 
subsidiaries are confronted with internal and external market pressures on grounds of 
cost-, efficiency- or productivity-based comparisons with internal or external competi-
tors. The governance of the focal or parent company is based on indirect regulation 
by the fixation of economic targets, management by objectives, result-oriented con-
trols and forms of ‘discursive coordination’ (Braczyk 2000: 562 pp.), in which eco-
nomic objectives between the focal company and its subsidiaries are agreed on or 
imposed on subsidiaries. Subsidiaries obtain the responsibilities and autonomy to 
attain these objectives by self-organisation. The principle of indirect regulation paves 
the way to internal markets within companies or network companies. It is also imple-
mented within subsidiaries or decentralised companies. The self-regulation of decen-
tralised organisational units is supported by an integration of operating and decision-
making and a reduction of the division of labour. Self-regulation at the workplace 
level rests on postfordistic work organisation with different forms of team or group 
work as a key feature. Contrary to the production models of Taylorism and Fordism 
employees are now often regarded as critical resources whose motivation, knowl-
edge, competences, commitment and even emotions are crucial to the attainment of 
economic goals (Schreyögg 1998: 218).  
Nevertheless, there is no clear trend from fordistic to postfordistic production re-
gimes, but rather a complex variety of forms of work organisations in different 
branches. An empirical study by the Institute of Labour and Technology (IAT) ana-
lysed changes in work organisations in Germany between 1993 and 1998. The hy-
pothesis, that the crisis of fordism opened up a new road to postfordistic production 
regimes, can be argued according to the IAT-study. It illustrates that the percentage 
of employees working in tayloristic or fordistic forms of work organisations increased 
from 37.4 per cent to 39.3 per cent as well as the share of employees working in 
posttayloristic forms of work organisations, which cover semi-autonomous team work 
and self-regulated individual work, raised from 22.7 per cent to 24.4 per cent (Bosch 
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2000: 253 p.). This result hints at a polarisation of work organisations in the 
German economy walking along with an imbalance in the distribution of wages: 
Nearly 50 per cent of employees employed in tayloristic or fordistic work organisa-
tions earned less than a net income of 1000 € per month, whilst such a net income 
only 25 per cent of the workforce working in postfordistic forms of work organisations 
obtained (Nordhaus-Janz/Pekruhl 2000: 38). Taylorisitc and posttayloristic forms of 
work organisations spread as well in industrial sectors as in service sectors. For in-
stance, one can detect tayloristic forms of work organisation in fast food restaurants, 
in call-centres with low quality tasks and especially in retail trade, which is character-
ised by an increase of often precarious forms of part-time work and further tayloristic 
division of labour (Bosch 2000: 254).  
7.3.2 Team Work and Self-Regulation at Work 
The sketched transformation of companies means a challenge to works councils and 
their self-image in several respects. First of all, the challenges to works councils by 
team working are referred to. In companies different types of team working may be 
introduced. They embrace work teams, as e.g. semi-autonomous group work, at the 
workplace level, parallel teams which operate alongside the formal organisational 
structure, as e.g. quality circles, project-teams formed for a specific purpose and a 
limited period of time and last but not least management teams (Cordery 2002: 326-
327). Despite the broad variety of work teams they share some common features, 
such as regular team meetings with a free choice of issues to be dealt with and the 
institutionalisation of a team speaker who represents the team and moderates dis-
cussion processes during team meetings (Minssen 1999: 136-137).  
Team working is at least in two respects a challenge to works councils: Firstly, team 
working and other forms of direct employee participation induced by management are 
often considered as a potential threat to works councils which undermine their role as 
representatives of the entire workforce and their monopoly on collective interest rep-
resentation at the establishment level (Müller-Jentsch 2003: 51). Sceptical works 
councillors argue that team work is a kind of competitor to works councils, especially 
offering options of direct individual and collective participation to employees. In this 
view team speakers are often regarded as a disliked rivalry to works councils. More-
over, works councils may consider team concepts as a threat to their social-
integrative function. In this perspective team work might foster group egoism and an 
internal fragmentation of employee interests. For example, work teams may develop 
internal structures and informal norms with the tendency to exclude those who do not 
comply with them.  
Notwithstanding, the sceptical point of view is not shared by all works councils. Em-
pirical findings show that especially strong works councils confide in their role of em-
ployee representatives and even support team concepts as options to link direct em-
ployee participation with representative participation by works councils (cf. Müller-
Jentsch 2003a: 468). These works councils often negotiate works agreements with 
the company management to introduce team working structures. In this perspective 
direct employee participation is regarded as a supplementary form of participation 
which can relieve works councils from the regulation of workplace matters. Moreover, 
the co-operation between works councillors with work teams widens their options to 
settle work-related problems and disputes by the direct involvement of workers’ ‘first 
hand expertise’ as a specific resource of knowledge and creativity for negotiations 
with the company management (cf. Hirsch-Kreinsen 1995). 
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The transformation of firms towards decentralised and market-driven 
organisations is accompanied with the internal break up of once established distribu-
tive patterns of power and status, defensive routines and established work practises. 
Furthermore, it may include transfers of employees and/or dismissals as a means of 
cost reductions. This transformation process increases the demands on works coun-
cils to safeguard the social integration of companies and to mediate between different 
groups of employees or in-company actors and their specific interests (Kotthoff 1995: 
435 pp.). In face of an enhanced collision of interests among in-company actors  
works councils  realise a rising demand in respect to training  in conflict resolution for 
an effective action as moderators and interest mediators (ibid.: 440).  
Tayloristic as well as posttayloristic forms of work organisations can be found simul-
taneously in many establishments whereby the demands for works councils in the 
field of work design and organisational development are increased. ‘Old recipes’ of a 
humane work design might be still useful to overcome a tayloristic division of labour, 
but they do not fit to postfordistic work organisations. Works councils are confronted 
with the ambiguous consequences of postfordistic work organisations which offer 
employees self-determination and self-regulation at the workplace and foster feelings 
of enthusiasm and commitment at work (cf. Warhurst/Thompson 1998; Becke et al. 
2003). However, new forms of psychological stress and health problems, such as 
burn-out or stress attributed to emotional labour, often occur in postfordistic work or-
ganisations (cf. Peter 2003; Hochschild 1983). Postfordistic work can also be charac-
terised by an intensification of and a disentanglement of work. This disentanglement 
is for instance marked by extended working hours and a removal of boundaries be-
tween work-related roles and the personality of employees (cf. Senghaas-Knobloch 
2001; Glißmann 2000), which may induce forms of self-alienation. Moreover, the dis-
entanglement of work in postfordistic production concepts is reinforced by the in-
creased significance attributed to customers. According to the principle ‘customer 
first’ or ‘customer is king’ customers are given priority in management and work proc-
esses. This principle often collides with established procedures, rules and competen-
cies which are available to works councils in order to protect employees (cf. Tietel 
2004). However, if employees identify to a large extent with their work and its related 
customer expectations, works councils’ efforts to protect employees from a disentan-
glement of work may be rejected by employees. The disentanglement of work is a 
new phenomenon for works councils to deal with compared to working conditions in 
fordistic work organisations. Therefore, the ambiguity of self-regulated work or post-
fordistic forms of work organisation leaves works councils behind with an increased 
demand for advice.  
7.3.3 The Ambivalence of Co-Management by Works Councils 
In processes of organisational transformation works councils take on a specific role of 
change agents attributed to the so-called co-management of in-company change 
processes or restructuring. This form of „co-operative modernisation“ (Bertelsmann-
Stiftung/Hans-Böckler-Stiftung 1998) is based on the participation of works councils 
in „strategic business decisions“ (Müller-Jentsch 2003: 51). In particular, co-
management is characterised by early information of works councils on trends related 
to the company development in order to enable works councils in good time to de-
velop demands in social and personnel respects. Then it contains an involvement of 
works councils in important in-company change processes by management. Last but 
not least, co-management rests on works councils’ access to all relevant information 
about the company. In return a company-oriented and economic way of thinking is 
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expected of works councils by management (Wassermann 2002: 60).  
Co-management is compatible with other important functions exerted by works coun-
cils, such as the protection of employees’ interests and the optimisation of organisa-
tional transitions. The top-management of companies often supports the function of 
co-management by works councils because it expects a relief of demands related to 
organisational transformation. Moreover, an active involvement of works councils of-
fers a stable and calculable organisational change in the view of management (Kot-
thoff 1995: 437).  
Two different levels of co-management can be distinguished each of them contains 
specific risks to works councils. The first refers to co-management at the level of 
company-management. At this level works councils are involved in the creation of 
strategies related to the further development of a company. Works councils’ contribu-
tion to strategy development consists above all in a preventive assessment of (poten-
tial) social consequences (ibid: 440). This active involvement is risky for works coun-
cils because they might lose the critical reflection of strategies proposed or favoured 
by the top-management. In case of a high identification with those strategies works 
councils may alienate themselves from the workforce they represent. The second 
level of co-management focuses on an active involvement of works councils in steer-
ing committees of organisational change. Contrary to the first level with works coun-
cils acting as generalists they act as experts and specialists at the second level. The 
risk related to co-management at the second level consists in being absorbed by de-
tailed problems of organisational change and a neglect of a strategic approach. Ac-
cording to Kotthoff this risk can be coped with, if works councils practise an internal 
division of labour with regard to the two levels of co-management (ibid.). Neverthe-
less, an effective co-management affords a special training of works councils to be 
capable of a reflective involvement in organisational change processes. Furthermore, 
it requires an access to internal and external expertise and a higher competence of 
works councils in the utilisation of adequate work methods for co-management. 
These requirements are necessary to enable works councils to develop alternatives 
to management-decisions (Wassermann 2002: 61).    
In economic crises of the 1990ies the relevance of “soft forms” of plant level em-
ployment policy increased in larger as well as in medium-sized companies. The 
Works Constitution Act provides works councils with the right to negotiate so-called 
social plans with management. In social plans measures to protect employees from 
dismissals are fixed. These measures can e.g. include alternatives to lay-offs, such 
as early retirement schemes, short time working, vocational training, in-company 
transfers of personnel or compensations for voluntary redundancies (Dombois 2001: 
140). Taking account of works councils’ rights related to the participation in selecting 
personnel, internal mobility and social plans the company management learned to 
prefer such soft forms of employment policy instead of favouring dismissals to over-
come crucial economic situations of a company. Redundancy remained the last 
measure to be taken. By pushing soft forms of employment policy at plant level works 
councils often succeeded at least in the protection of the core workforce from dis-
missals and sustained job stability - so far the ‘bright side of the moon’. However, this 
successful employment policy contains also a ‘dark side of the moon’. It is revealed 
by higher obstacles to employees of the external labour market to gain access to 
companies. In the long run work is carried out with a shrinking core workforce, if 
companies turn into “fortresses” against the external labour market. This may ques-
tion the basis for a competitive in-company knowledge management as well as in-
creased work intensification for the remaining core workforce.  
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7.3.4 Fragmentation of Works Councils by Network Companies 
The transformation of companies into strategic network companies or networks of 
companies leads to an erosion of companies in the traditional sense. Therefore, net-
work companies are a threat to the foundations of the Works Constitution Act, which 
was not conceptualised for network structures of companies. According to Kotthoff 
(1995: 443) such network structures contribute to an erosion of the so-called “para-
digm of the establishment” as a pillar of the German works constitution. This para-
digm consists of the guiding principle of establishments as hierarchically structured 
communities of production combined with a unity of management and operation. The 
described institutional configuration of works councils is embedded in this community 
of production. The latter also builds a platform for the social exchange between man-
agement and works councils. The foundations of social exchange, i.e. reciprocal in-
formation and communication between in-company social partners and a stable rela-
tionship as basis for mutual trust and reliability, are questioned by the structure of 
network companies. The satellite-establishments of network companies are often 
sub- or sub-sub-companies. This means that the management of such satellites is 
only provided with fewer competences in strategic decision-making. In this case top-
managers of subsidiaries are not anymore the relevant counterpart to works councils 
because significant strategic decisions are made at higher levels, as e.g. at the hold-
ing level of network companies, to which works council do not have any access to. 
Because of the very limited range of strategic decision-making at the level of subsidi-
ary-managers the social exchange between management and works councils erodes. 
Works councils are left behind without any direct counterpart on the management 
side. A prerequisite of social exchange at the establishment level consists in manag-
ers equipped with relevant competences of decision-making (cf. Dörre 1999: 200; 
Kotthoff 1995: 443).  
This problem is enhanced in multinational network companies with different centres 
of decision-making located in several countries. In multinationals or large network 
companies social exchange between works councils and management at the estab-
lishment or company level is furthermore questioned by the emergence of a new so-
cial type of top-managers. Their orientation of action is marked by flexibility and their 
determination to attain economic goals in a variety of companies (ibid.). Flexibility 
becomes a key feature for promotion and career options; furthermore, it is a test of 
one’s proof of worth (cf. Sennett 1998). Flexibility requires the change of top-
management positions. Thereby, it contradicts to continuity as the basis of social ex-
change between management and works councils. If flexibility replaces continuity on 
the managers’ side, they will hardly develop a social affiliation and responsibility to-
wards a certain company or establishment. In case of management changes works 
councils face difficulties in preserving the social integrative community of production 
(Kotthoff 1995: 443-444). Social exchange is a crucial social resource for trust-related 
alliances of modernisation at the establishment level (Dörre 1999: 199). If it erodes, 
prospects of a social integrative modernisation of firms will fail. 
Processes of transformation continue also in network companies. In many cases they 
are linked with redundancies, selling and buying of companies or subsidiaries, clo-
sures of inefficient satellite-companies or plants. Moreover, processes of outsourcing 
open up opportunities to change sectoral areas of collective bargaining. Therefore, 
the outsourcing of in-company units as subsidiaries is often linked with working 
conditions being altered. Outsourced subsidiaries which belong to a sectoral area of 
collective bargaining different to the parent company may create new demands for 
employees, as e.g. comparatively lower wages or longer working hours and 
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ployees, as e.g. comparatively lower wages or longer working hours and 
enhanced insecurity of employment perspectives. It also leads to a social disintegra-
tion on the side of employees: Splitting up entire workforces in several workforces of 
different subsidiaries weakens the spatial as well as the social cohesion among em-
ployees (Wassermann 2002: 95). Moreover, this split up of entire workforces may 
walk along with a fragmentation of former larger works councils to several minor 
works councils each of them representing the workforce of a certain subsidiary. This 
tendency confronts works councils with higher or new demands in co-ordinating 
themselves on a level superior to a single establishment, subsidiary or company. In 
order to eschew that the interests of employees and works councils of different sub-
sidiaries or companies are played off against each other by co-ordinated manage-
ment activities at the network level, works councils are going to found networks on 
their own. Networking among different works councils at a holding level requires spe-
cific qualifications and competences to co-operate effectively in network companies. 
The new challenges to works councils in network companies cannot be met with es-
tablished structures of works councils on a corporate level, because network compa-
nies embrace a larger spectre of branches and markets. Therefore, works councils 
co-operating in networks superior to the subsidiary or establishment level have also 
to direct their attention more closely to these different branches, markets and diverse 
groups of customers (ibid.). Such informal forms of networking among works councils 
within network companies lack a legal basis for co-determination in the works consti-
tution act of 1972. This lack is not astonishing, because at the beginning of the 
1970ies nowadays network companies were unknown to legislators.  
 37
7.4 The Decentralisation of Collective Bargaining to the 
Establishment Level 
During the 1990ies the severe crisis the German economy faced increased the de-
mand to find flexible solutions towards rationalisation, enhanced competitiveness and 
the avoidance or at least limitation of redundancies. Therefore, employers’ associa-
tions and trade unions often agreed on the utilisation of a legal option within the legal 
frameworks of the Works Constitution Act (§ 77) and the Collective Agreement Act (§ 
4) which provides so-called opening clauses to enable supplementary works agree-
ments to collective agreements. According to these acts employers’ associations and 
trade unions can authorise management and works councils at the plant level to con-
clude supplementary works agreements (Jacobi et al. 1998: 218)12 for the duration of 
a collective agreement. In this view collective agreements function as frameworks, in 
which general rules, margins of wage increases and pillars for the regulation of new 
matters are fixed, whilst the specific regulation and differentiation of general norms is 
delegated to the plant level (Jacobi 2003: 35). The supplementary works agreements 
have to comply with the collective agreements. Opening clauses foster forms of 
“concession bargaining” which rest on the core idea that opening clauses facilitate 
firms to reduce labour costs or to increase productivity, whilst in return employment is 
guaranteed at the plant level (Dombois 2001: 148). 
There are several options for opening clauses which can refer to entrance pay, eco-
nomic hardship, location investments, working time corridors, competition between 
different sectoral collective agreements, the suspension or postponement of wage 
rises or branch clauses (for an overview see Jacobi 2003: 35-36). To put it in a nut-
shell, two general types of opening clauses can be distinguished (Seifert 1999: 158): 
The first type refers to financial or monetary concessions, as e.g. deferments of pay 
increases, lower entrance pay for young or unemployed workers and a reduction or 
differentiation of standard rates of wages. The second type of opening clauses is di-
rected to the flexibilisation of working time. It may include a (temporarily) reduction or 
extension of working time without monetary compensation, the implementation of 
working time accounts and agreements in respect to the accumulation and compen-
sation of overtime.     
The combined regulation of collective and works agreements via opening clauses 
enlarge the options of firms to find specific and flexible solutions to economic prob-
lems or challenges, which cannot be met sufficiently by generalised norms of collec-
tive agreements. Therefore, opening clauses on the one hand increase the adaptabil-
ity and flexibility of multi-employer sectoral agreements of collective bargaining to 
specific situations of firms. In this perspective opening clauses enable a downgrading 
of collectively agreed standards to improve or stabilise the economic situation of firms 
and protect employees from dismissals (Dombois 2001: 149).  On the other hand the 
                                                
12 The spectre of opening clauses ranges from “soft recommendations to “obligatory conditions” to social partners 
at the establishment level (Müller-Jentsch 1997: 289). Opening clauses were in the past mainly utilised in bargain-
ing processes on flexible working time. When the IG Metall succeeded in collective bargaining in 1984 introducing 
the 38.5 hours working week employer associations pushed in return to opening clauses for a flexible implementa-
tion of the weekly working hour reduction at the plant level. These negotiations triggered off about 10.000 works 
agreements on flexible working hours in the metal industry (ibid: 289 pp.).      
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generalising character of collective agreements is undermined leaving 
behind heterogeneity of implementation at the establishment level.  
This decentralisation of collective bargaining policy means that the establishment 
level emerges as an additional locus of distributive bargaining, which is linked with 
new challenges to the institution of works councils: Works councils often have to 
cope with processes of organisational transformation and decentralisation. Opening 
clauses and “alliances for jobs” at the establishment level enlarge their spectre of 
tasks and responsibilities, especially in the field of collective bargaining. The decen-
tralisation of collective bargaining functions towards the establishment level under-
mines the established division of labour between the political arenas of the works 
constitution and collective bargaining (Müller-Jentsch 2003a: 468). It also poses an-
other important demand on works councils, which might lead to a “structural over-
charge” (Schmidt/Trinczek 1999: 122) and undermine social exchange at the estab-
lishment level (Kotthoff 1995: 446). Works councils have experience with social ex-
change and its affiliated integrative bargaining. However, they may be neither accus-
tomed to nor qualified enough to cope with distributive bargaining processes and its 
related economic exchange. In respect to distributive bargaining they also lack the 
trade union power of sanctions.  
Above all in an economic crisis of an establishment or in times of enhanced eco-
nomic competition the works councils’ range of action and negotiation in distributive 
bargaining is limited. This especially counts for situations, in which works councils 
make concessions to managers on matters, in which works councils have a strong 
legal position (Schmidt/Trinczek 1999: 122). In times of an enhanced economic com-
petition the logic of competitive restructuring prevails in industrial relations at the es-
tablishment level. This complicates integrative compromise on rationalisation be-
tween management and works councils. Then works councils solely remain negotia-
tion strategies which aim at restricting negative effects of competitive restructuring as 
much as possible. In face of drastic financial cutbacks and competitive restructuring 
combined with redundancies works councils concentrate on defensive action in order 
to restrict or eschew further dismissals and to negotiate compensations for employ-
ees who suffer from dismissals or outsourcing (cf. Hirsch-Kreinsen 1995: 375; Dörre 
1999: 201 p.). For example, the management of big German companies, such as e.g. 
DaimlerChrysler and Siemens, threatened to close down production plants in Ger-
many and defer production to low wage countries in order to reduce labour costs. In 
collective bargaining negotiations between management and works councils and the 
IG Metall union agreements were recently settled which focus on an extension of 
working hours without financial compensation for employees. A prerequisite to cope 
with and to reduce structural overcharge on the side of works councils consists in 
support, advice and training offered by trade unions. Such a support requires suffi-
cient capacities and resources of trade unions. Here, the door to another challenge to 
works councils is opened. 
7.5 Fragile Trade Union Support to Works Councils  
During the 1990ies both of employer associations and trade unions suffered from a 
decrease in social legitimacy. Employer associations had to face an increase in exits, 
especially by smaller and medium-sized companies being seldom the target of trade 
union strikes. Moreover, many newly founded companies, as e.g. firms of the new 
economy, and American-based multinationals, such as McDonald’s and Wal Mart, 
avoided to join any German employer association. This tendency weakened the soli-
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darity among employers and their power to generalise collective agreements at 
sectoral levels. As a reaction to these problems some employer associations offered 
firms a special “non-coverage” membership status in order to stay close to the collec-
tive bargaining structure without complying with standards of sectoral collective 
agreements (Jacobi 2003: 27). The scope and the coverage of collective agreements 
declined during the 1990ies. For instance, between 1995 and 1997 the percentage of 
private-sector establishments in West Germany adhered to multi-employer sectoral 
agreements decreased from 52 per cent to 49 per cent. Looking at employees whose 
working conditions are regulated by collective agreements this meant that their share 
declined from 70 per cent to 65 per cent (Dombois 2001: 150).   
The decline in union membership can be partly attributed to processes of de-
industrialisation in eastern Germany, which went along with the closure of former key 
industries as an important reservoir of union membership. The expansion of the ser-
vice sector enhanced an altered composition of the German workforce since the 
1980ies; white-collar employees outweighed blue-collar workers. This change was 
not mirrored in union membership, because 70 per cent of the entire union member-
ship consisted of blue-collar workers in 2001, most of them working in the public sec-
tor and traditional industrial branches (Jacobi 2003: 21). Between 1994 and 1998 the 
DGB-affiliated trade unions lost 15 per cent of their membership. In other words the 
trade unions’ membership decreased from 9.768.373 million members in 1994 to 
8.310.783 members in 1998 (Dombois 2001: 152). Recently published statistical fig-
ures hint at a further process of membership decrease since then because in De-
cember 2002 the DGB-affiliated unions covered 7.7 million members in December 
2002 (Jacobi 2003: 20).  
The membership of most of German trade unions is dominated by male blue-collar or 
public sector service workers. Therefore, trade unions are still oriented towards the 
protection of the standard employment relationship and a wage policy which reflects 
the image of the male and sole family provider. German trade unions developed 
comparatively few initiatives to modernise their understanding of work or labour tak-
ing account of altered gender relations and of women’s stronger work-orientation (cf. 
Schnack/Gesterkamp 1998: 220 p.)  Although the workforce of the rapidly expanding 
service sector is characterised by a still continuous increase in female employment, 
women are underrepresented in trade unions according to their share in the entire 
workforce in the German economy13. Among male workers 36.5 per cent are mem-
bers of DGB-affiliated trade unions, whilst only 21.8 per cent of all female workers are 
organised in these unions (Jacobi et al. 1998: 203).  
Moreover, trade unions are worried about the low and yet still declining number of 
young members under 25 years (Dombois 2001: 152). Only 17 per cent of younger 
workers are members of DGB-affiliated unions (Jacobi et al. 1998: 203). This loss of 
membership may also indicate that German trade unions were not capable to de-
velop appropriate membership strategies in respect to the recruitment and binding of 
new members in the face of general trends of social individualisation and a stronger 
                                                
13 In 2000 43.5 per cent of the entire workforce was female in the German economy (compared to 42 per cent 
within the workforce of the European Union). The increase of female employment went along with an expansion of 
part-time work. Between 1990 and 2000 the percentage of part-time work increased from 13.3 per cent to 17.6 per 
cent in Germany (European Union: from 13.3 per cent to 16.3 per cent). In 2000 nearly 87 per cent of all part-time 
workers in the German economy were women (Ruppert, 2003: 106 p.).    
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social differentiation even in former cohesive working class segments (cf. 
Geiling 2001).  
The decline in membership walked along with a decrease of membership fees which 
restricted drastically the financial resources of many trade unions14, especially 
smaller unions suffered from financial losses. Therefore, the crisis of social legitimacy 
resulted in a financial crisis in many trade unions which triggered mergers of unions 
based on take-overs as well as amalgamations, as for example the newly founded 
large service sector trade union ver.di. At the end of the 1990ies only eight out of the 
former 16 German unions (1950) survived. The remaining trade unions often re-
stricted the range of their activities to ‘core business’, as e.g. collective bargaining, 
social or industrial policy, and underscored service-orientation as a pathway to attract 
new members or to halt the ongoing decline in membership (cf. Martens 2001: 177).   
Nevertheless, mergers of trade unions caused severe problems at the union level as 
well as at the level of works councils: First of all, some mergers were accompanied 
by disputes between the involved trade unions. Conflicts did not only result from 
quarrels about the distribution of power positions, influence or financial resources, but 
were also attributed to different organisational cultures of unions (cf. Klatt 1997). 
Secondly, mergers created larger trade unions with a more heterogeneous member-
ship. As a result of the increased heterogeneity the interests of membership widened 
and became more differentiated (Jacobi 2003: 22). Thirdly, mergers turn out to be of 
disadvantage to works councils in some respects: Mergers often are accompanied by 
processes of centralisation and cost reductions. Both of these tendencies lead to a 
reduction of highly qualified fulltime trade union functionaries at the level of local ex-
ecutive bodies. These local functionaries can provide works councils with advice and 
support in processes of organisational transformation and may facilitate them in 
processes of the decentralisation of distributive bargaining at the establishment level. 
The centralisation of trade union organisations also embraces a centralisation of 
highly qualified functionaries to the headquarters of trade unions, thus increasing the 
barriers to works councils for direct support and consultancy. In sum, the conclusion 
can be drawn that the centralisation of German trade unions and the reduction of 
their financial resources will not be sufficient to meet the challenge of an increased 
demand on advice and support provided for works councils (Schmidt/Trinczek 1999: 
122). 
                                                
14 The decline in union membership triggers off reorganisation processes and bargaining conflicts 
within unions as organisations. For instance, the trade union ver.di nearly lost 300.000 members be-
tween March 2001 and December 2003. Until the end of 2002 the financial deficit mounted to 71.5 
million €. This deficit induced consequences for the nearly 5000 employees at ver.di (Sauga 2004: 
71): The national executive committee of ver.di and the ver.di-works council settled an agreement in 
2003 which included a forcible loan to ver.di financed by a wage-cut of five per cent for half a year. 
Moreover, voluntary reductions of working hours by employees will not be financially compensated 
anymore. In the meantime, the financial deficit expanded because of an ongoing decline in member-
ship. Under these circumstances the national executive committee pushes urgently for further cost 
reductions in forms of compulsory reductions of working time without financial compensation for all 
ver.di-employees. The announcement of additional financial cuts is rejected by the ver.di-works coun-
cil who interprets it as a violation of the settled and still valid agreement. It sounds paradoxically, but 
the reorganisation processes of trade unions motivated disappointed union employees to join the as-
sociation of union-employees (VGB, i.e. Verband der Gewerkschaftsbeschäftigten), which was 
founded to negotiate collective bargaining agreements with the DGB-affiliated unions as employers 
(ibid).          
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8. Institutional Learning as a Starting Point to meet new  
Challenges 
8.1 Learning and Institutions – a Contradiction? 
Initiating und sustaining processes of learning proves to be on the one hand a vital 
prerequisite of institutions of the German system of industrial relations to adapt to 
economic and societal change and to cope with new challenges which arise from the 
self-dynamic interaction processes within the social figurations of industrial relations 
as well as to imprint on or influence these change processes. On the other hand insti-
tutions are generally characterised by an inert tendency to maintain social order and 
stability. Institutions restrict the potential range of social action via normative means 
of regulation, as e.g. social conventions, social rules or norms and the power of sanc-
tions, and by influencing the social cognition of actors. They serve two significant 
functions: To form human needs and to safeguard the existence of societies and their 
structures enabling social order (cf. Lipp 1992: 136). In governing social and eco-
nomic action institutions also serve as elastic and multifunctional mechanisms to me-
diate and channel social tensions (ibid.). As social filters institutions select choices of 
social action and in decision-making which are appropriate in a certain situation (Vis-
ser 1996: 5). Delivering information to mutually interdependent actors, as e.g. in the 
case of industrial relations, and providing sanctions they support social actors in the 
development of mutual expectations and therefore contribute to an enhanced pre-
dictability of social action (ibid.). Whilst institutions focus on social stability and the 
predictability of social action they partly lack inventiveness and are often resistant to 
change. Institutional change is on the one hand a prerequisite of societal change be-
cause social change often evolves by the reformation or creation of institutions (cf. 
Lipp 1992: 137). On the other hand institutional change often takes place at a relative 
slow pace and is to a high extent characterised by path dependency. Therefore, ‘un-
conventional’ forms of change, which are alien to the historic corridor of institutional 
evolution, such as institutional breakages or collapses, seldom occur. Path depend-
ency means that the further development of institutions is influenced by the formative 
period, in which institution building took place. According to Müller-Jentsch (2003a: 
472) institutional change takes often place at ‘historic points of intersection’ which 
alter power relations between involved social actors and create structures of oppor-
tunity for an institutional reform or redesign15.       
Institutional learning is a form of institutional change. In respect to the system of in-
dustrial relations it is closely linked with collective learning processes among and be-
tween the different social actors being involved in. There exist two ways of institu-
                                                
15 Such ‘historic points of intersection’ are for example wars, the election of a new government in de-
mocracies (as for instance the first German government led by the social-democratic party and chan-
cellor Willy Brandt), global economic crises or important industrial disputes and their outcomes. The 
institution of works constitution or works councils in Germany is a good example of path dependency 
of institutional development because the institution of works constitution was created by the state, i.e. 
by legislation of the social-democratic government and parliament in 1920 with its core features still 
valid today (cf. Wassermann 2002; Schmidt/Trinczek 1999).     
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tional learning: Firstly, it can occur more or less unintentionally, embedded in self-
dynamic social interactions between actors. Secondly, it can take place as an organ-
ised collective learning process of social actors who shape institutions and their re-
lated social norms and rules and reflect underlying basic assumptions affiliated with 
institutions. Works councils and trade unions are significant social actors who influ-
ence the development of works constitution or collective bargaining as social institu-
tions. As socially established actors which are legally guarded against their abolition 
they became social institutions on their own.  
In respect to the new challenges works councils face today, I would like to discuss 
demands of institutional learning at the level of works councils and even at the level 
of trade unions, which might contribute to cope effectively with these challenges. The 
discussion of some demands related to institutional learning is focussed on organised 
collective learning processes. Institutional learning refers among others to the level of 
institutional norms and rules and the guiding principles of institutions. It also em-
braces institutional actors’ strategies and practises related to institutions. Institutions 
are products of social interaction and learning, i.e. they are created, challenged and 
changed by social actors. Taking account of the social constitution of institutions re-
quires reference to the social construction of institutions. Actors bring on cognitive 
maps, values, beliefs and basic assumptions in interaction processes linked with in-
stitutional development. These dispositions are often learnt implicitly, as e.g. in proc-
esses of internalisation and socialisation in institutional settings. The power of institu-
tions to govern everyday action can be attributed to their often implicit character in 
social action or decision-making because institutions are often taken for granted 
without being reflected from time to time (cf. Preskill/Torres 1999: 99). If social con-
structions and dispositions are rooted deeply in everyday practises in institutional 
settings, they achieve a high extent of social acceptance. Social actors tend to sus-
tain and defend these constructions even against contradicting evidence or incidents 
(Argyris 1996). Such defensive routines often turn out to be strong barriers to institu-
tional learning, above all if questioning these social constructions is regarded as a 
threat to established institutions. Moreover, social constructions guide the awareness 
and interpretation of socio-economic change and may prove to be highly selective in 
the development of practises, strategies and mechanisms to cope with challenges 
institutional actors realise and define as such.        
Despite the power of defensive routines institutional learning can be initiated and 
promoted. As the history of works councils in Germany proved, institutional learning 
can take place, if an institution is challenged by conflicts between social actors or 
new strategies designed by works councils’ ‘counterparts’. For instance, the institu-
tion of works councils remained its stability and social recognition among employees 
when management introduced participative production concepts to the establishment 
level. Works councils often coped successfully with the underlying risk that this par-
ticipative management offer to employees could undermine their interest representa-
tion by opening up their interest representation to employees whereby new space for 
dialogue between works councils and employees was created. Furthermore, works 
councils played an active role in the implementation of participative production con-
cepts on grounds of co-management. Institutional learning can be initiated, if an insti-
tution is threatened in existence or at least facing a severe crisis. This requires that 
institutional actors recognise such a threat or crisis. For example, the decline in 
membership German trade unions face indicates a crisis of social legitimacy. There-
fore, the recognition of existential threats or crises may serve as a starting point to 
institutional learning, reflecting and altering established routines, practises, strategies 
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and dominant social constructions of reality. Furthermore, institutional learning 
can be fostered, if institutional actors develop and implement mechanisms and pro-
cedures to reflect and to examine, whether their strategies, core beliefs and assump-
tions are still appropriate to meet new challenges. This requires to a certain extent 
previous institutional learning having created or enhanced an institutional awareness 
and sensitivity to changes within an institutional environment.            
8.2. Institutional Learning of Works Councils 
In my opinion the future of works councils as a relevant pillar or the German system 
of industrial relations is closely woven with a reflective modernisation of works coun-
cils and trade unions which is based on processes of institutional learning. Works 
councils would be overestimated to meet the sketched new challenges without any 
support. They require a supportive infrastructure reproduced and sustained by trade 
unions. However, unions remain also highly dependent on works councils: They will 
not overcome their financial misery by giving priority to the development and imple-
mentation of cost cutting programs, but rather they also have to increase their mem-
bership. Insofar, they still depend on works councils to recruit new members. More-
over, unions require the support of works councils to build up or mobilise their power 
base of members in industrial conflicts. Therefore, it could be assumed, that ‘the 
song remains the same’ - under altered circumstances. Notwithstanding, there are 
hints, that - despite this mutual interdependence between works councils and unions 
- the linkage between the two institutions will lessen. For instance, a new study on 
the regulation of interests in the digital economy (Städtler et al. 2004) illustrates, that 
in areas dominated by highly qualified employees, the social reputation of works 
councils as an institution is comparatively positive, especially if employees had direct 
experience with works councils. However, most of the interviewed highly qualified 
employees disapprove of trade unions because they are regarded e.g. as pillars of 
the ‘old economy’, not in touch with the lifeworld of employees in the digital economy 
and hence incompetent to represent their interests (ibid.: 156). These empirical find-
ings indicate that even if unions support employees to establish works councils in 
firms of the digital economy, they cannot rely on works councils as a recruiting base 
for union membership, at least in areas dominated by highly qualified knowledge 
workers. This tendency might lead to a further shift of the figuration and its asymmet-
rical power balance (cf. Elias 1993; Mennell 1992) between works councils and un-
ions in favour of works councils. However, an eroding support of trade unions by em-
ployees may cause even severe problems for works councils because in order to 
cope successfully with new challenges - especially if functions of collective bargain-
ing are delegated to the establishment level and works councils are confronted with 
the spread of network companies – they will to a larger extent remain dependent on 
support and advice provided by unions.  
8.2.1 Critical Reflection of Practises in Interest Representation 
An institutional learning of works councils in order to meet new challenges linked with 
postfordistic and participative production concepts includes a reflection of practices of 
interest representation. In this case works councils’ institutional learning may be fos-
tered by co-management and an enhanced involvement of and dialogue with em-
ployees. In processes of organisational transformation co-management proves to be 
a core demand to works councils. Works councils have to create and enhance re-
sources to combine co-management with conceptual participation, i.e. to influence 
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and imprint on company-strategies by confronting management with their own 
strategic ideas and concepts to sustain the competitiveness of companies as well as 
to safeguard the in-company lifeworld and the interests of employees. Co-
management therefore requires works councils to supplement their protective strate-
gies by conceptual strategies which aim at the further development of companies and 
their social lifeworlds. 
In order to avoid being trapped in or absorbed by detail work of co-management (cf. 
Kotthoff 1995), works council should integrate employees, their competencies and 
tacit knowledge to design and to collectively reflect processes of organisational 
change and transformation. Opening up interest representation to forms of direct par-
ticipation also counterbalances management efforts to integrate employees and their 
human resources by participative management concepts. Additionally, such linkages 
between representative and direct participation are compatible with many employees’ 
expectations to be recognised as industrial citizens in companies (cf. Müller-Jentsch 
1994). They also take account of – especially highly qualified or younger - employ-
ees’ interest in a higher extent of self-representation. Works councils may attract em-
ployees to direct participation as well as to become candidates for works council 
elections, if they e.g. check and utilise innovative forms of co-determination and di-
rect participation first practiced in firms of the digital economy.  
Works councillors often develop a self-understanding and orientation of action which 
rests on the assumption that works councils representing the entire workforce of an 
establishment do not only act on behalf of the workforce but can also rely on their 
expertise knowledge in highly regulated and legally codified fields of negotiation (as 
e.g. occupational health and safety), in which works councils attained a knowledge 
advantage compared to employees. This orientation of action and self-image is linked 
with established routines of communication. Due to these routines works councils 
tend to act as competent and in some ways paternalistic or autocratic interest repre-
sentatives, who define social situations to be intervened in.  
In processes of organisational transformation as well as in implementation processes 
of innovations at the establishment level, as e.g. distant-work or the introduction of 
environmental management systems, the character of fields of negotiations changes 
to less specific, sometimes ambiguous matters of negotiations, which cannot be 
regulated by norms and codifications because of their contingent nature. For in-
stance, the process and/or outcomes of participative management approaches can-
not be foreseen. Therefore, the traditional status of works councillors as experts of 
interest representation is questioned. Furthermore, works councillors’ paternalistic 
orientation of action towards employees is challenged by employees’ expectations to 
be treated also by works councils as competent problem solvers at the workplace. 
Works councils can cope with contingent organisational change processes if they 
alter their communicative style and enlarge their traditional role-set by developing or 
enhancing roles of co-manager, interest mediator and ‘in-company translator’ be-
tween different subcultures or work-cultures (cf. Klatt 1994; Kotthoff 1995). As media-
tor and translator between diverse groups of employees or subcultures of a company 
(cf. Klatt 1997) works councils can explore groups’ specific demands and interests 
related to innovations or organisational change processes and mediate between 
them to develop a concise concept or an approach to design change processes in 
which the management perspective is balanced with the lifeworld-perpective of em-
ployees and in-company-subcultures or work-cultures. In this view works councils 
take on the role of a ‘frontier commuter’ being capable to identify with different sub-
cultures or groups of employees and management. This capability enables works 
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councils to open intermediary spaces for dialogue and organisational learning be-
tween different subcultures (cf. Tietel 2001). Developing roles as in-company life-
worlds mediators or ‘frontier commuters’ and translators between different work- or 
subcultures enlarges works councils’ capacity of action to better cope with highly con-
tingent issues or change processes. Nevertheless, ‘frontier commuters’ often walk on 
thin ice. For instance, they might face reproaches of missing loyalty by (groups of) 
employees works councils represent (ibid.).  
Organisational change is always linked with not-intended consequences and results, 
because it is embedded in social figurations between different in-company actors (cf. 
Becke 2002). Figurations are characterised by asymmetrical balances which undergo 
changes on grounds of processes of negotiation between involved social actors. Fig-
urations create ‘chains’ of social action including a self-dynamic which can neither be 
overlooked nor forecasted by any specific social actor because their range of action 
and awareness of interaction processes is limited (cf. Elias 1993; Mennell 1992). 
Creating social spaces for dialogue on organisational change enables works councils 
to discuss with employees their expectations and interests with respect to organisa-
tional change and to mutually reflect (potential) problematic and not-intended conse-
quences of organisational change as a starting point for further processes of organ-
isational learning and negotiations with management. By creating social spaces for a 
reflective dialogue with employees affiliated to specific work cultures, which are e.g. 
rooted in specific units or sections of a company, works councils enhance their 
chances to detect not-intended effects of organisational change within and between 
different organisational units. This may foster their competencies in ‘system thinking’ 
(cf. Senge 1990) as a resource of action to shape organisational change as proc-
esses of organisational learning. Moreover, the dialogue between works councils and 
employees as members of specific in-company work cultures can be supportive to 
works councils in negotiations with management utilising the local knowledge and 
experience base of work cultures as early indicators of problems related to organisa-
tional change.  
However, a support of employees to works councils is not self-evident in processes 
of organisational change. An in-print study on subjective experience and coping 
strategies of works councillors in processes of organisational change, which was 
mainly carried out in the service economy, illustrates that works councils are con-
fronted with a ‘competition on employees’ (cf. Tietel 2004). Participative management 
approaches and postfordistic production concepts may prove to be as incentives to 
employees to join the side of management. In this case works councils might lose 
their basis of interest representation in the workforce of an establishment. Therefore, 
the ‘competition on employees’ appears from a works council’s perspective as a 
combat to win employees’ ‘hands, hearts and minds’ (cf. Warhurst/Thompson 1998). 
Workforce support for works councils’ establishment-related labour policy turns out to 
be fragile. Therefore, works councils have to invest time and capacities of action to 
achieve the support of employees. In the perspective of works councillors this ‘com-
petition on employees’ is regarded as a painful experience because it demonstrates a 
lack of social recognition by the workforce they represent (Tietel 2004). This problem 
underscores the significance of triangle relationships works councils are embedded in 
(cf. ibid; Tietel 2001). They are confronted with demands to balance triangle relation-
ships with management and employees as well as with trade unions and manage-
ment. In my view the reflection of triangle relationships therefore turns out to be a 
significant requirement to enhance works councils’ capacities of action in organisa-
tional change processes. Supervision or coaching offered to works councils might 
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provide assistance to cope with complex triangle relationships in organisational 
change.         
8.2.2 Diversity as Social Resource of Interest Representation 
Institutional learning of works councils could take account of the diversity of employ-
ees as a reservoir for an improved interest representation. Facilitating employees of 
underrepresented groups to become elected as works councillors might provide 
works councils with competencies, skills and experience which had been neglected 
before. Turning to the social composition of works councils it is striking that some 
groups of employees are underrepresented according to their share in the entire la-
bour force. This especially refers to women and migrants as works councillors. For 
example, more than ten per cent of the labour force in Germany consists of migrant 
employees, whilst less than five per cent of elected works councillors are migrants 
(Müller-Jentsch 1997: 279). In the 1990ies only about 23 per cent of works council-
lors were women (cf. Jacobi et al. 1998: 211) compared to ca. 40 per cent of their 
share in the entire workforce of the German economy. Problems in respect to works 
councils’ social legitimacy may arise, if this social gap of representation widens. Fur-
thermore, an enhanced representation of nowadays underrepresented groups of em-
ployees could improve the sensitivity to their perspectives in works councils’ every-
day practices and routines as well as in co-managing organisational change. Studies 
on the relationship between gender and reorganisation processes indicate that the 
representation of female employees in works councils enhances options to take ac-
count of the problematic work situation of women in reorganisation processes, e.g. 
typical labour intensive ‘female workplaces’ often belong to the kind of jobs which are 
outsourced or which do not benefit from postfordistic production concepts introduced 
to firms (cf. Kutzner 2003). An improved representation of women in works councils 
could at least sensitise works councils and management for the gender dimension of 
work and organisation. At its best it could promote ideas and concepts of gender de-
mocracy supported by gender sensitive works councillors as well as male and female 
employees. In Germany a gender-related institutional learning of works councils 
might be fostered by the amendment of the Works Constitution Act in 2001: It in-
cludes provisions about a minority share of women in works councils. Due to these 
provisions the percentage of women elected to works councils has to be equivalent to 
their percentage within the workforce of a company (ibid: 31)16. 
Recent restrictions imposed by government on future early retirement, the increase 
of employees’ average age and company policies to defer or restrict new engage-
ment of employees and apprenticeships as means of cost-cutting question works 
councils’ practises on early retirement schemes at the establishment level and maybe 
even their attitude towards older employees. Therefore, works councils could develop 
age-sensible strategies which might contain at least three starting points: Firstly, by 
taking account of an increased average age of employees works councils can pro-
mote and negotiate concepts of health promotion, an age-oriented work design and 
                                                
16 There are empirical hints that the gender provision of the new Works Councils Act contributed to increase the 
share of women among works councils. A recent empirical study analysed the results of works council elections in 
spring 2002 referring to branches, in which unionised employees are members of the IG Metall. The study re-
flected an increase of female works councillors from 18 per cent to 23 per cent between 1998 and 2002, whilst the 
percentage of women among the company workforces decreased slightly to less than 21 per cent (cf. Ru-
dolph/Wassermann 2002).      
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in-company career or task change planning which facilitates older 
employees to sustain their health and resources. This implies training concepts tai-
lored to the needs and experience of older employees in order to comply with new 
work-related demands. Secondly, it includes taking account of diverse generations of 
employees at the plant level. Works councils could foster inter-generational co-
operation and mediate conflicts between different age-groups or generation groups 
within the entire workforce. Different generation or age groups of employees often 
share a common set of work- or company-related experience, reality constructions 
and social or employment status (cf. Mannheim 1980). A key task for works councils 
consists in facilitating a social climate of mutual recognition between different age or 
generation groups which contribute to avoid or overcome a depreciation of older em-
ployees, their knowledge and experience. Last but not least, works councils can de-
velop strategies to design the transition of older employees to retirement at the es-
tablishment level. For example, this may contain forms of ‘bridge employment’ which 
allow older employees a (partial) withdrawal from their long-term position and in re-
turn offer them other rewarding tasks. An example of such tasks could be mentoring 
or training younger employees to fully take over their position after retirement. These 
starting points rest on the prerequisite that works councillors reflect critically their ba-
sic assumptions towards older employees, especially if these assumptions are based 
on prejudice against older employees.                    
8.2.3 Co-operation of Works Councils 
Fusions, mergers and acquisitions which create or alter multinational companies as 
well as the transformation of companies into network companies with different, more 
or less autonomous subsidiaries challenge work councils because these tendencies 
demonstrate the limits of an establishment centred or single company-centred co-
determination. These tendencies increase the demand of works councils’ institutional 
learning with respect to an enhanced co-operation among works councils of different 
companies or subsidiaries on regional, national and even international level. It in-
cludes the necessity to develop procedures of co-ordination, mutual consultation and 
strategy development among different works councils to enable and facilitate a co-
ordinated interest representation or co-determination at the level of multinational cor-
porations or network companies. Such co-ordinated actions should also contain pre-
cautions to eschew that the involved works councils are played off against each other 
by the top-management of network companies or multinationals, as e.g. in decisions 
to outsource or defer production or jobs.      
In respect to the transformation of companies into network companies the new Works 
Constitution Act of 2001 offers a better starting point for co-determination to works 
councils (cf. Wassermann 2002), yet it still has to be proved whether and how far this 
legal innovation facilitates works councils to meet the challenges linked with network 
companies. The reform of the Works Constitution Act may turn out to support institu-
tional learning of works councils. For example, the act (§1) provides a legal platform 
for the election of a unitary works council in a so-called “joint establishment” in com-
pany networks with different subsidiaries. In this case the joint works council is 
elected by employees of the involved subsidiaries. The new model of co-
determination at the level of company networks is especially suitable for networks of 
satellite firms, in which the management of satellites has only a limited range of 
autonomy and therefore is also restricted in its role as employer. This enables a uni-
tary interest representation at the company network level by the joint works council 
and fosters a social integration among employees of different satellite firms of a net-
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work company. Nevertheless, there are some obvious barriers to this kind of 
interest representation because the new model of co-determination is not compatible 
with all kinds of company networks. In dynamic markets - accompanied with an inte-
gration of outsourced satellites into new branches and an outsourcing of business 
units as a first step towards sale or fusion - the new model does not work (ibid: 156).   
Furthermore, the new Works Constitution Act enlarges the legal basis for the devel-
opment of new works council-structures at the level of network companies. The new 
Works Constitution Act opens up options to elect a joint works council and to com-
bine different establishments in network companies to specific areas of interest rep-
resentation via collective or works agreements, if it contributes to an easier founda-
tion of works councils or enables an “appropriate interest representation of employ-
ees”, as formulated in § 3 of the Works Constitution Act of 2001. This provision cre-
ates opportunities for new forms of co-operation of works councils related to different 
companies. It also provides a legal basis for still existing forms of inter-company co-
operation between works councils. 
At the level of multinational companies the European directive 94/94EU on European 
Works Councils provides a legal framework for interest representation in multination-
als with several companies or establishments in different European countries. This 
directive was criticised for being ineffective in terms of the regulation of industrial re-
lations at the level of multinational companies. In this view the European directive on 
European Works Councils failed to halt processes of ‘social dumping’ between estab-
lishments of multinationals and between multinationals and single European member 
states, i.e. it is supposed that European industrial relations at the level of multination-
als will be dominated by fragmentation instead of European harmonisation (cf. Helbig 
1999: 245 pp.). From a German industrial relations’ perspective criticism is raised 
against the low level of participation rights European works councils are provided with 
in regard to co-determination rights of German works councils17. Despite this criticism 
the potential of this directive should not be underestimated: It offers works councils a 
platform for a co-ordinated interest representation at the level of multinationals. Insti-
tutional defects were partly compensated by activities of European works councils 
(EWC) involving employees (Dörre 1999a: 319). Moreover, there is no evidence that 
the EU-directive generally fosters processes of social dumping. Evaluation studies on 
the implementation impacts of the EWC-directive on industrial relations in German-
based multinationals, such as Volkswagen AG, indicate that a high level of regulation 
was maintained. In some multinationals EWC succeeded in negotiating frame 
agreements with top management (Müller-Jentsch 2003a: 471). In case of Volks-
wagen European works councils developed as an effective body of interest represen-
tation and co-ordination in terms of co-operative conflict resolution with management 
and of solidarity in balancing employment reductions or increases between different 
European establishments (Helbig 1999: 258). EWC at Volkswagen turned out as an 
intermediary body which fostered the transfer of German-based industrial relations at 
the company level to other European-based establishments and companies affiliated 
to Volkswagen (ibid.). In my view this empirical finding reflects also that German 
works councils contain a potential for institutional learning at the level of European 
works councils. Finally, the practise of EWC will evoke demands to reform the EU-
                                                
17 According to the EU-directive European Works Councils’ participation rights are limited to rights of 
information and consultation (Müller-Jentsch 2003a: 470 p.).  
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directive on European Works Councils claiming stronger rights of participation 
(Dörre 1999a: 319).       
8.3 Institutional Learning of Trade Unions 
Institutional learning of works councils is a necessary, but not sufficient precondition 
to sustain the capacities of social action and co-determination linked with this institu-
tion. Works councils will in the middle range and in the long run still depend on un-
ions as a solid infrastructure for co-determination by works councils, especially to 
meet new demands related to a decentralisation of collective bargaining at the estab-
lishment level and to processes of organisational transformation. In face of a decline 
in membership and the extension of co-determination-free-zones the existence of 
trade unions as a stable and relevant social institution is at stake. If trade unions lose 
further political influence and bargaining power, the infrastructure they offer works 
councils will be questioned. However, the demand of their supportive infrastructure 
by works councils also depends on the capability of trade unions to provide advice, 
expertise and consultancy tailored to the needs of works councils and employees. If 
services and infrastructure of trade unions are regarded as inappropriate to problems 
works councils and employees are confronted with, the latter will hardly ask for their 
advice and support. In this case chances to increase union membership would also 
diminish for trade unions. Therefore, an enhanced service orientation of unions to-
wards works councils and employees is per se no remedy to cure severe decline in 
union membership or to compensate a decline in loyalty based on traditional working 
class orientations and affection to unions (cf. Streeck 1987: 475). Even if works 
councils ask for advice, it cannot be taken for  
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granted that they promote union membership among the workforce they 
represent (cf. Städtler et al. 2004).  
Regarding the altered social composition of the workforce in the German economy 
and the expansion of the service sector trade unions do not remain the obvious insti-
tution works councils and employees turn to in order to seek advice and support. 
Traditional close links between employees and trade unions loosen in face of proc-
esses of social individualisation and sectoral change. Employees tend to be more 
sceptical of whether trade unions are capable of delivering competent support and 
advice. In this view unions are often regarded as too distant to the lifeworld of em-
ployees and their working conditions. Such a sceptical or negative image of trade 
unions may to some degree reflect prejudice against trade unions. In my view it also 
may convey a cultural gap between the altered work-related lifeworlds of employees 
and even of works councils on the one hand and trade unions on the other hand. In 
Germany trade unions are to a still significant extent oriented towards the image of 
the male, fully employed blue collar worker in industry or in public services. This 
group of employees was for a long time the backbone of trade union support and 
membership. Trade unions often negated the increased diversity of the workforce in 
the German economy whereby a distance to different groups of employees was cre-
ated. This especially refers to groups of employees who do not resemble the domi-
nant image of employees sustained by unions. Participation marks a further relevant 
dimension of this cultural gap: Trade unions are still bureaucratic and hierarchical 
non-profit organisations, in which forms of direct participation are more or less re-
stricted to elections of representatives at the local level. This lack of participation con-
trasts e.g. to increased demands to work-related involvement and self-determination 
among young employees who often regard work as a source of self-development (cf. 
Baethge 1994).  
Furthermore, the sectoral change is accompanied by an altered relationship between 
works councils and trade unions. In traditional industrial sectors and in public ser-
vices sometimes works councils act as the “extended arm of trade unions”, more of-
ten they display an ambivalent orientation of action (Schmidt/Trinczek 1991): On the 
one hand they co-operate with management in order to contribute to the economic 
competitiveness of the plant, on the other hand they take account of the specific in-
terests of employees which often contradict to economic interests related to the es-
tablishment. Besides, they are confronted with trade union demands and their collec-
tive interests which often collide with the specific interests of employees as well as 
with economic interests. Within this three-fold dilemma works councils try to balance 
the different interests they are confronted with in their workaday lifeworld. Balancing 
these different interests is linked with giving priority to solutions of compromise.  
As shown before, there exists e.g. a strong retention of highly qualified workforces in 
the digital economy towards unions and union membership. In such areas of the ser-
vice sector or the digital economy works councils or employees’ representatives with 
a very detached attitude towards unions are no exception. These works councils of-
ten avoid contact with unions or regard the relationship between employees’ repre-
sentatives at the establishment level and unions as a one way street (ibid), i.e. unions 
are regarded solely as service organisations without any support offered to unions in 
return. Such employees’ representatives only seek the advice of unions, if difficult 
legal matters cannot be handled by themselves properly or if they depend on specific 
knowledge they are not capable of. This detached orientation towards unions is re-
flected in the low profile of works councils in recruiting union members and a reluc-
tance to mobilise employees for union support in times of industrial disputes. More-
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over, they do not engage in trade union activities at the local level. Bodies of 
union representatives hardly exist in such companies. This tendency hints at a cul-
tural gap between trade unions and employees and sometimes even works councils. 
It reflects the necessity of trade unions to initiate processes of institutional learning, if 
they want to remain attractive to employees and to sustain a supportive basis for col-
lective bargaining.  
Institutional learning by trade unions may contribute to eschew the extension of co-
determination-free zones in the expanding service economies, to halt the decline in 
union membership and to strengthen the linkage between unions and employees’ 
representatives at the establishment level. Moreover, it is directed to enhance trade 
unions capacities in labour policy in order to develop and to promote alternatives to 
neo-liberal policy concepts and strategies (cf. Martens 2001: 179). However, institu-
tional learning turns out to be a significant challenge to trade unions which can be 
described as bureaucratic, more or less traditionally oriented non-profit organisations 
which offer seldom enlarged options to membership participation (cf. Zech 1998; 
Martens 2001). Contrary to business organisations, trade unions have to balance the 
interests of diverse target groups of membership who are affiliated to a different ex-
tent to unions. At least three different groups of union membership can be distin-
guished: full-time union functionaries, honorary functionaries, such as works council-
lors or union representatives at the establishment level, and ordinary union members. 
The expectations of these groups differ in respect to trade unions. For instance, full-
time functionaries might be interested in the development and goal attainment of un-
ion’s labour policy, whilst works councillors as honorary functionaries expect services 
from trade unions tailored to their needs and to meet establishment-related chal-
lenges. Last but not least, ordinary members may seek for advice and information in 
respect to specific work-related problems (Zech 1998). Therefore, institutional learn-
ing turns out as a rather complex process in trade unions in which the different mem-
berships and their interests or expectations have to be taken account and involved in. 
Therefore, institutional learning of trade unions requires processes of organisational 
development based on the involvement of different membership groups.18     
 
In my view three different starting points of institutional learning at the level of trade 
unions, which might be directed to enhance works councils’ capacities of action in 
order to meet new challenges, can be identified: 
 Diversity strategies of membership recruitment and binding 
 Issues of political or collective action 
 The improvement of regional capacities of action.  
These starting points are closely interconnected.  
8.3.1 The Development of Diversity Strategies 
The idea of developing diversity strategies refers to the practical and academic dis-
cussion on diversity as a new management concept (cf. Krell 1997; Thomas 2002; 
Thomas/Ely 2002). I would not like to recommend trade unions to utilise diversity 
management as a recipe, but rather to consider its core ideas for the development of 
                                                
18 In many German trade unions processes of organisational development were carried out (cf. Mar-
tens 2001; Alemann/Schmid 1998), mainly in response to a decline in membership and induced finan-
cial deficits or linked with the merger of different unions. However, a broader participation of union 
members proved to be rather the exception than the rule.   
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innovative strategies in addressing employees as well as recruiting and 
binding union members.  Diversity management refers to the altered social composi-
tion of the workforce in modern societies, which is becoming more diverse because 
of different social processes, such as e.g. an increase of migrant workers in times of 
Europeanisation and globalisation, an increase in female employment and processes 
of social individualisation which foster a diversity of social milieus and lifestyles. In 
the perspective of diversity management differences among employees are a poten-
tial key to innovation, competitiveness and flexibility of an organisation, if diversity is 
realised, honoured and fostered by drawing on the different talents and skills of a di-
verse workforce (cf. Gabriel et al. 2002: 217 pp.).  
From a trade unions’ perspective the idea of diversity first of all would imply to take 
their leave of their dominant image of a ‘normal employee’. The development of 
strategies and advice to an assumed ‘normal employee’ negates and violates the 
specific needs of different groups of employees (ibid: 218). The recognition of diver-
sity implies to reflect critically the fictional image of the male, fully employed blue col-
lar worker and sole family provider as ‘normal employee’. A critical reflection of basic 
assumptions on the ‘normal employee’ is a necessary first step to diversity strategies. 
Furthermore, it requires union functionaries to explore closely the needs and interests 
of different groups supported by an attitude of openness, curiosity and sensitivity with 
respect to different work-related lifeworlds, work cultures and groups of employees. 
Such an attitude may be fostered by an enhanced organisational sensitivity and rec-
ognition of diversity within unions. Exploring diversity requires an interactive process 
between unions or their representatives on the one hand and employees and works 
councils on the other hand. Enhancing capacities of trade unions’ action at local or 
regional level can contribute to explore diversity and to develop strategies in address-
ing and binding diverse groups of employees or union members, such as e.g. part-
time workers, free-lancers, women, migrants and salaried knowledge workers.    
Diversity strategies imply the development of advice or service offers tailored to dif-
ferent groups of employees, their needs and interests. For example, unions may es-
tablish a hotline or develop brochures for free lancers in the new economy which in-
form them about their legal rights and union services. The implementation of such 
new services requires a service-orientation of union functionaries towards honorary 
members as well as towards employees seeking advice. Such offers may in a longer 
perspective even contribute to overcome resentment on the side of specific groups of 
employees, such as highly qualified white collar workers. To attract employees of the 
digital economy to trade unions some unions started to innovate their strategies ad-
dressing employees by the utilisation of new technologies as information platforms 
and offering services to employees without limitation to trade union membership 
(Abel/Ittermann 2003: 114). In this case, signing on new trade union members re-
mains solely a potential further step. For instance, the large service sector trade un-
ion ver.di financed a project team called connexx.av which initiated the build up of a 
works council in one of the model firms of the new economy (Pixelpark) in Germany 
utilising an e-mail campaign19 (cf. Gesterkamp 2002). Such new strategies form 
structures of opportunities whereby employees can obtain union support in respect to 
                                                
19 Further information on this initiative can be obtained from the connex-webpage http://www.connexx-
av.de/aktuelles. 
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specific work-related problems and settings. These structures of 
opportunities also function in another direction: They may contribute to overcome 
mutual stereotypes between specific groups of employees and union representatives 
and to strengthen the ties between both sides.    
Union strategies of diversity might also be useful in order to address works councils. 
Trade unions are to bear in mind tendencies of a changed social composition of 
works councils since the end of the 1990ies (Schmidt/Trinczek 1999: 123): Firstly, the 
potential of recruitment for works councils changes from blue collar workers to white 
collar workers partly embracing salaried workers with higher qualification and pro-
moted former blue collar workers who attained the status of salaried employees. In 
the meantime, works councils composed of a majority of salaried employees prevail 
in many firms at least in the service economy. Secondly, this altered social composi-
tion of works councils walks along with a different self-image as well as with a differ-
ent style of establishment policy. Works councils dominated by salaried employees 
are characterised by a stronger emphasis on rationality in processes of social ex-
change with management, a higher degree of delegation and participation with re-
gard to employees and a tendency of increased professionalisation and qualification. 
Moreover, these works councils opt more often for strategies of co-management and 
prefer team-oriented work styles. Their relationship to trade unions is marked by a 
stronger emphasis on matter-of-fact co-operation compared to an emphasis on soli-
darity and emotionality (ibid).     
Until now diversity was solely discussed with regard to attracting and binding em-
ployees or works councils to trade unions. Besides this external dimension there ex-
ists an internal demand for diversity strategies which is closely woven with the ten-
dency of forming large multi-sectoral trade unions in Germany. Such trade unions 
imply an increased heterogeneity of membership with regard to different criteria, such 
as gender, qualification, social status and origin, work traditions or affiliation to differ-
ent trade union cultures. For example, the IG Bauen-Agrar-Umwelt (IG BAU) as one 
of the newly founded multi-sectoral trade unions covers construction workers, forest 
workers and gardeners. Before the merger the IG BAU consisted mainly of male 
construction workers. Merging with minor unions implied that the IG BAU today also 
represents sectors which are quite different from their traditional membership, as e.g. 
female employees are a relevant factor among gardeners. They share with forest 
workers quite different work and union traditions compared to construction workers. 
Problems related to an integration of different trade union cultures in mergers or fu-
sions of unions to multi-sectoral trade unions (cf. Klatt 1997) can be reinforced, if di-
versity in membership is negated. In face of an increasingly diverse membership un-
ions have to be aware to balance different interests of members without neglecting or 
preferring the needs of specific groups of members. Multi-sectoral unions can draw 
on the different qualifications, experience and competences of members in order to 
develop policy strategies tailored to different fields of action. However, this requires 
an organisational recognition of diversity, a stronger participation of union members 
and a reflection of existing or prevailing work practises.  
Drawing on different members’ or functionaries’ experience with work practises ob-
tained in their former union may serve as a productive potential for innovative union 
strategies, services and advice offers. In this view diversity in unions is closely linked 
with cultural change and a reflection or change of strategies and work processes 
within unions as organisations (cf. Thomas/Ely 2002). It tackles also the relationship 
between employed union functionaries and honorary members opening up spaces for 
an enhanced involvement of honorary members within unions. Moreover, multi-
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sectoral unions can refer to the different traditions, structures and strategies of 
their merged or fused unions in order to develop innovative strategies. 
Unions which are sensitive to diversity in membership might direct capacities to an 
internal union building in order to develop a common set of norms, goals and priori-
ties of action, i.e. a normative union platform as a ‘boundary object’ (cf. Strübing 
1997) to which different groups of union members can refer to. In order to create a 
well accepted platform participation of union members is required. However, such a 
platform as a boundary object to different groups of union membership does not ex-
clude conflicts once agreed on, but is open to further processes of conflict or negotia-
tions taking account of the potential change of interests or in membership composi-
tion or changes in union environments to which a specific platform proves to be inap-
propriate.         
8.3.2  Issues of Political or Collective Action 
From a perspective of diversity unions may recognise different life worlds employees 
are embedded in and the moral demands and social values they are affiliated to, 
such as e.g. environmental orientations of action or beliefs in fairness and justice. 
Therefore, addressing to new potential members and binding a diverse membership 
can be combined with issues of political or collective action which reflect or refer to 
different lifeworlds of employees. An enlarged spectre of issues may be partly attrac-
tive to specific groups of employees, but it includes the disadvantage that the profile 
of a certain trade union might blur. This disadvantage can be avoided, if new issues 
taken up by unions are framed within their thematic spectre of industrial relations, i.e. 
if new issues are related to or combined with established fields of union action, such 
as collective bargaining or social, health and employment policies, or if they refer to 
the primary task20 of unions, i.e. the labour policy-related interest representation of 
employees. In this perspective new issues, as e.g. ‘work-life balance’, sustainability21 
or demographic change, may include in three ways an innovative potential for unions: 
Firstly, taking up new issues or the anticipation of new societal trends might open up 
spaces of dialogue with groups of employees who convey more or less a sceptical 
attitude to unions or works councils. Secondly, unions may deal with new issues in 
order to symbolically demonstrate their modernity in public or political discourses in 
order to gain access to or an improved position or recognition in areas of innovation 
policy. Last but not least, taking up new issues is a starting point to develop new 
strategies or concepts, service and advice to works councils who are confronted with 
                                                
20 The concept of ‘primary task’ reflects a key concept of the socio-technical approach of the Tavistock 
Institute. The primary task refers to the primary goals of an organisation. In other words, the primary 
task can be described as the task or the central purpose an organisation was founded to carry out or 
to fulfil (cf. Rice 1958; Hirschhorn 1999; Senghaas-Knobloch 2001).   
21 In the public and scientific discourse on sustainability labour was acknowledged as a core category 
of sustainability (cf. Brandl/Hildebrandt 2002; Ammon et al. 2002). Sustainability refers to a triple di-
mension approach which embraces the interlinked dimensions of social, economic and environmental 
sustainability. In Germany there hardly exist any studies which analysed works councils pattern of 
labour policy on sustainability at the establishment level, especially in respect to firms which promote 
sustainability as a new management concept. In regard to trade unions a new research project started 
recently which examines potentials and barriers to the development and implementation of trade union 
dialogue on sustainability by the example of the IG BAU, i.e. the former construction workers trade 
union (cf. sfs/Peco-Institute 2004).   
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these issues. Examples of such issues are the implementation of new 
technologies at the establishment or inter-company level or the development of de-
mands for the design of sustainable work systems which can reduce or eschew an 
intensification of work in knowledge intensive sectors or in work cultures dominated 
by highly qualified salaried employees (cf. Docherty et al. 2002). In my view the issue 
of ‘good work’ is a significant starting point to enlarge the focus of unions’ employ-
ment strategies, which concentrate on safeguarding or creating employment. The 
issue of ‘good work’ can strengthen qualitative aspects of union employment policy. 
Unions could start or intensify a public debate about criteria, demands and concepts 
of ‘good work’ addressing ambivalent effects of postfordistic forms of work organisa-
tion on employees. This issue might also open union access to employees in the new 
service economy, especially to highly qualified, salaried employees interested in the 
avoidance of the disentanglement between work and their private sphere.               
8.3.3 The Improvement of Regional Capacities of Collective Action 
Mergers of unions are accompanied by a centralisation of financial resources and 
personnel within newly founded multi-sectoral trade unions (cf. Martens 2000). 
Therefore, decision-making processes, in which a centralisation of resources and 
personnel is fostered, reduce the regional or local capacities of trade union action. 
Restricting or cutting off regional capacities of action may at first glance appear as an 
adequate contribution to solve the financial crisis unions are in. In political terms this 
cost-cutting-strategy turns out to be rather problematic because it endangers unions’ 
stance as a relevant political actor at the regional level. A (partial) regional withdrawal 
of unions restricts their regional capacities of action in at least three ways: Firstly, the 
local or regional level is - besides the establishment level - the main locus of direct 
interaction between union representatives and employees, i.e. a significant platform 
to obtain access to new potential members and to the lifeworlds of different groups of 
employees. Centralisation of resources complicates the establishment and continuity 
of direct interactions with employees at the local or regional level. Direct interactions 
between union representatives and employees enable the latter to build up or place 
institutional trust in unions and their offered advice and services. Institutional trust is 
an important prerequisite of and a social resource for unions to increase their mem-
bership as well as for binding and mobilising members for political or industrial action. 
Therefore, processes of centralisation restrict the options of unions to foster institu-
tional trust in direct social interactions with employees at the regional level. 
Secondly, a centralisation of unions’ resources and personnel can impair the quality 
of advice and services offered to works councils, especially if works councils are con-
fronted with severe challenges, such as organisational transformation processes and 
a partial decentralisation of collective bargaining to the establishment level. In case of 
personnel reduction or extensions of the regional scope unions’ functionaries have to 
cover they may face a situation of enhanced work-related overcharge. Often these 
union representatives act as ‘single combatants’ (ibid). Therefore, processes of union 
centralisation can indirectly restrict works councils’ capacities of action, if the suppor-
tive union infrastructure they depend on is endangered or deteriorates in quality at 
the regional or local level.  
Last but not least, processes of union centralisation may restrict resources and ca-
pacities of local or regional union bodies and functionaries required in order to main-
tain their involvement as active participants in regional development and innovation 
networks based on co-operation between employers, unions, works councils, cham-
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bers of industry and commerce or craft and local or regional political authorities 
or political actors. Such regional innovation networks can contribute to socially em-
bed economic action of even large firms by fostering interactive regional learning 
processes and the development of regional social capital. This includes, that even 
firms which operate at an international level are introduced to social conventions of 
economic development which prevail in regions (cf. Morgan 1997: 500 p.). Firms can 
only afford to violate partly such social conventions, if they depend on regional ca-
pacities, resources and infrastructure or labour market as potential competitive ad-
vantages for the achievement of their economic assets (cf. Hirsch-Kreinsen 1997). 
Moreover, the local or regional public sphere may turn out to be a critical factor even 
for multinationals, if their social reputation is questioned or their economic action is 
publicly scandalised (cf. Dörre 1999: 204). If union bodies at the regional or local 
level are equipped with sufficient resources, they can play an active role in such re-
gional development networks. In this case they will be able to co-produce regional 
social conventions and social capital in order to socially embed economic action.   
In my view the discussed negative side effects of union centralisation strategies re-
quire a critical reflection within German unions. They also call for a more decentral-
ised trade union engagement strengthening the local or regional capacities of collec-
tive action. This may contain at least a partly redistribution of financial resources and 
of highly qualified union personnel to the local or regional level. Such a two-fold redis-
tribution of resources would enlarge as well as improve the capacities of trade unions 
at the local or regional level to initiate or support the foundation of works councils, 
especially in co-determination-free zones, and provide works councils with direct 
support and a highly qualified consultancy and information to meet new challenges. 
Moreover, better equipped executive bodies of unions at the local or regional levels 
are a prerequisite for an improved and more effective engagement of unions in local 
or regional alliances for jobs and vocational training or in regional networks of innova-
tion and employment policy.  
Notwithstanding, a redistribution of resources and highly qualified personnel towards 
the regional level will - in face of the severe financial deficits trade unions are con-
fronted with – only partly be realised. Therefore, a supplementary strategy could fo-
cus on a closer networking between union functionaries and honorary union mem-
bers. This would enable local or regional union bodies and their functionaries to draw 
more intensively on the skills, competences and experience of honorary members in 
organising and supporting union action and initiatives at the local or regional level. 
Issue-oriented co-operation with other interest groups or non-governmental organisa-
tions are a further starting point to achieve union goals at the regional level by the 
combination of resources related to different social actors. For instance, some un-
ions, as e.g. ver.di, and their members co-operate closely with attac in several Ger-
man towns to foster public awareness of economic globalisation and its negative side 
effects on labour, social standards and working conditions (cf. Grefe et al. 2002) as 
well as to demonstrate against the current supply-side oriented reforms of the ‘red-
green’ German government in social and employment policy. However, the involve-
ment of unions in inter-organisational networks at the local or regional level also im-
plies a risk potential for unions: Networking is directed to enhance or enlarge local or 
regional capacities of action. To form coalitions or to found networks and to develop 
co-ordinated action requires compromise which might restrict unions’ autonomy and 
capability of action (cf. Streeck 1987: 489).    
Institutional learning of unions contains organising issue-oriented public dialogues at 
the local or regional level directed to employees and works councils without limiting 
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access to union membership22. Such forms of open dialogues may even 
appeal to employees or works councillors who are not affiliated with any of the DGB-
unions or are sceptical of unions. They lower potential access barriers to such works 
councillors or employees and may also integrate researchers, consultants and train-
ers to broaden the available expertise (cf. Kutzner/Kock 2003: 179)23. Involving dif-
ferent social actors in forms of regional dialogue enables an intersection of different 
social worlds (Strauss 1993). Intersection provides trade unions and works councils 
with knowledge and expertise which might enlarge their scope of strategies and deci-
sion-making criteria related to specific problems they face; sometimes intersections 
can even induce institutional actors to reflect their core beliefs (Wiesenthal 1995: 
147). In this perspective intersection is a form on unconventional institutional learning 
partly dissolving or at least loosening up established borders between institutions or 
institutional actors and their environments (ibid: 145).    
Last but not least, institutional learning of trade unions can be fostered by co-
ordinated forms of inter-union co-operation24. Such forms of co-operation are an in-
novative starting point for inter-organisational learning processes of unions overcom-
ing the sector related barriers to union co-operation. They also can serve as a sup-
portive infrastructure for works councils related to different sectors but being con-
fronted with similar problems. This refers firstly for outsourced production-related 
services, as e.g. software-development, logistics or call-centres, in which working 
conditions and environments are similar despite different sectoral backgrounds 
(Kutzner/Kock 2003). Secondly, such an inter-union co-operation makes sense to co-
ordinate unions’ and works councils’ activities in network companies or at the level of 
multinational corporations and with regard to processes of supply-chain reorganisa-
tion, which might affect jobs and working conditions of employees. Trade unions 
could play a crucial role in the foundation and the support of inter-company or com-
pany network works councils, especially if unions co-operate more closely in union 
networks to accompany the transformation of company networks with satellites affili-
ated to different branches. Co-ordinated inter-union initiatives can support problem-
oriented exchange of experience between works councils embedded in different 
company cultures and branches. Furthermore, they may form a platform to develop 
co-ordinated concepts of consultancy and support among different unions tailored to 
                                                
22 Helmut Martens (2001: 179) expounds even a new model for trade unions: the ‘network union’, 
which is based on the creation of spaces of internal and external dialogue with other social actors, 
especially at the levels of establishments and regions, in order to develop alternatives to neo-liberal 
policy approaches.   
23 An example of good practise was developed in Dortmund by the trade union ver.di, and the DGB-
related co-operation agency ‘science – labour’ organising a regular ‘call centre talk’ (cf. Kutzner/Kock 
2003: 178 p.). Invited to and involved in the call centre talk are union members, works councillors, call 
centre-employees as well as consultants, social researchers, trainers and representatives of the local 
economy and employment agency. Contrary to union organisations neither union membership nor a 
fixed membership in the regular call centre talk is a prerequisite to take part in. As shown before, the 
call centre talk is also addressed to participants who do not work in call centres bringing in their spe-
cific expertise. The call centre talk triggered further activities, such as the development of a research 
project on labour relations in call centres, co-operation between researchers and works councils with 
regard to occupational health and safety issues in call centres or the publication of a regular newslet-
ter which informs about the local call centre ‘scene’ in Dortmund.       
24 Inter-union co-operation also contains a European dimension. In recent years trade unions in 
Europe became more sensitive to international co-operation and co-ordination of unions’ strategies 
and collective bargaining policies as means to shape a ‘social Europe’ (cf. Jacobi et al. 1998: 231).     
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the needs of works councils being confronted with processes of supply 
chain reorganisation. Such innovative forms of inter-union co-operation were mostly 
practised as pilot projects25. Therefore, they still have to be developed and stabilised 
among trade unions.          
9. Conclusion 
In summary, institutional learning plays in a two-fold way a crucial role for works 
councils as an institution of the German system of industrial relations: Firstly, institu-
tional learning can enhance the stability, adaptability and the further development of 
interest representation and co-management of works councils. However, ‘internal’ 
processes of institutional learning of works councils are limited in their scope and ef-
fectiveness, because they do not equip works councils sufficiently with capacities of 
action required to meet new challenges arising from a partial decentralisation of col-
lective bargaining to the establishment level, the transformation of companies into 
network companies, the ambivalence of postfordistic production and service concepts 
on working conditions or the altered social composition of the workforce. The institu-
tion of works councils appears to be overcharged to cope with these new challenges 
on its own. Therefore, works councils’ institutional learning secondly has to be 
enlarged by taking up innovative impulses from trade unions in order to develop spe-
cific action strategies to cope with these new challenges at the establishment or inter-
company level.  
However, giving a fresh impetus to works councils also requires processes of institu-
tional learning at the level of trade unions. A significant prerequisite to provide a sup-
portive infrastructure of information, advice, consultancy and training, which enables 
works councils to cope with new demands effectively, consists of a critical reflection 
of ‘basic assumptions’ (cf. Schein 1999) most of the German trade unions shared 
with regard to the image of employees they represent. This includes taking account 
of the altered social composition of the entire workforce in the German economy and 
its social diversity. Such a critical reflection might be a starting point to develop more 
differentiated strategies and supportive services tailored to specific work cultures and 
organisational fields employees are embedded in. Moreover, a re-discovery of the 
local or regional level as a resource to enhance trade unions’ capacities of action 
could foster institutional learning processes of trade unions, especially as a platform 
for the development of new forms of work-related dialogues with works councils and 
diverse groups of employees, for networking between different unions and with other 
social institutions or organisations, such as non-governmental organisations, re-
search institutes and regional or local authorities. Open forms of work-related re-
                                                
25 For instance, the trade unions of metal and chemical workers co-operated in an inter-company ac-
tion research project, which was set up by the two unions and Volkswagen (cf. Ammon et al. 1996). 
During the project different metal- and chemical based alternatives to a PVC-solution in car construc-
tion were assessed and compared to the PVC-alternative on basis of a product life cycle analysis. 
Moreover, different starting points for the involvement of employees in company and inter-company 
product policy and with regard to the means of life cycle analysis were tested. The unions organised 
workshops, in which works councillors and employees of the involved companies discussed among 
other issues the potential impacts of a potential substitution of PVC with regard to the establishments 
they were affiliated to, exchanged experience of working conditions along the product chain and de-
veloped a catalogue of demands for the implementation of life cycle analysis in companies from em-
ployees’ perspective. 
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gional dialogue may prove in the long run as an interesting starting point to foster 
or initiate the foundation of works councils within the expanding service economy. 
They can also contribute to build up or enhance institutional trust in trade unions by 
employees and works councils. Institutional trust remains a crucial factor for the so-
cial recognition of trade unions as an important social institution by works councils 
and employees in new service sectors as well as in German society. Last but not 
least, such open forms of dialogue between trade unions, works councils and other 
social actors might be utilised by trade unions to innovate their labour or social policy, 
as e.g. to develop new projects and concepts. 
In conclusion, the future of works councils as a hybrid and innovative institution of 
German industrial relations will depend on the symbiotic relationship between works 
councils and trade unions. Both of them will remain mutually interdependent to meet 
new challenges which tend to undermine or threaten their existence. Therefore, a 
figuration of co-operation between trade unions and works councils may also turn out 
to be of relevance in future. If co-determination-free-zones continue to spread, trade 
unions will lose their most important backbone of mobilisation for industrial conflict 
and labour policy. A disjunction of trade unions and works councils can also occur, if 
newly founded or existing works councils loosen their ties to trade unions, as e.g. in 
case of works councils dominated by highly qualified salaried employees who are 
characterised by a sceptical attitude towards unions. Therefore, institutional learning 
by trade unions might prove to be as a significant prerequisite to re-establish or to 
enhance a figuration of co-operation between trade unions and works councils. How-
ever, this symbiotic relationship will be supplemented compared to previous decades. 
In my view forms of co-operation between works councils, as e.g. at the levels of 
network companies or multinationals, will gain in significance as well as forms of co-
operation among different trade unions. Restructuring is often not limited to the es-
tablishment or company level but extended to rationalisation processes which focus 
on supply chains or products. In order to develop labour-oriented strategies and con-
cepts to safeguard employee interests and to seek for options of a humane design of 
such restructuring processes closer inter-union co-operations which also involve 
works councils of different firms alongside supply chains or product life cycles is re-
quired. Furthermore, inter-union co-operation is a significant prerequisite to promote 
a co-ordinated labour policy in processes of social dialogue at the European level. In 
this perspective inter-union co-operation might foster the development of a project 
called ‘Social Europe’, which contrasts to neo-liberal policy models.         
The perspective of social diversity can be utilised likewise as a social resource of in-
stitutional learning by works councils and trade unions. The utilisation of this social 
resource requires trade unions and works councils to take account of the increased 
social diversity of employees and to recognise diversity as relevant issue to direct 
their action to. The perspective of diversity enables works councils to enhance their 
sensitivity for hidden forms of discrimination at the workplace or establishment level. 
It also increases their ability to explore the differentiated structure of needs and inter-
ests within the workforce at the establishment level. Therefore, the perspective of 
diversity can support works councils to take on the roles as mediator, moderator and 
‘frontier commuter’ in processes of organisational change. The recognition of diver-
sity might serve as a starting point to develop innovative strategies of interest repre-
sentation or to open new fields of labour policy at the establishment level, as e.g. 
generation policy or gender democracy.  Moreover, the recognition of social diversity 
turns out as a significant prerequisite to draw on the competences, knowledge and 
experience of diverse groups of employees. This also refers to trade unions, if they 
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intend to involve honorary members or employees in union activities. The 
perspective of diversity might pay off for trade unions because it enables them to de-
velop services and advice tailored to specific groups of employees which in return 
can increase and intensify communication and dialogue with different groups of em-
ployees. In this view, the recognition of diversity can stimulate or enhance institu-
tional trust placed in trade unions by diverse groups of employees.   
The starting points of institutional learning which were discussed in respect to works 
councils and trade unions can contribute to a further modernisation of industrial rela-
tions in Germany. However, the institution of works councils will still face severe 
tests: Competitive restructuring will continue, outsourcing of services and production 
and the transfer of employment to so-called ‘low wage’ countries remain a threat of 
closure to many a German establishment and hence to the existence of its works 
council. Therefore, institutional learning, renewal and reform will remain on the 
agenda of works councils and trade unions in order to sustain their existence and to 
innovate their labour policy.  
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